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Chapter 1
Introduction To Public Key
Cryptography
Cryptography has been an area of mathematical study for centuries. Historically, the
study of cryptography focused on the design of systems that provide secret communica-
tion over an insecure channel. Recently, individuals, corporations, and governments have
started to demand privacy, authenticity, and reliability in all sorts of communication,
from online shopping to discussions of national secrets. As a result, the goals of cryptog-
raphy have become more all-encompassing; now, cryptography might better be defined as
the design of systems that need to withstand any malicious attempts to abuse them. This
thesis will focus on modern algorithms and techniques for confidentiality, which are also
known as encryption schemes. However, the purposes of cryptography include not only
secret or confidential communication, but also authentication of the entities involved in
the communication, authentication of the data transmitted by those entities, and many
1
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others.
The oldest encryption schemes are known as symmetric key or secret key systems.
Such systems consist of two main algorithms: an encryption algorithm, which allows one
entity to encrypt or “scramble” data, and a decryption algorithm, which allows another
entity to decrypt or “unscramble” data. Each of these algorithms has an input called a
key, which dictates some aspect of the algorithm’s behaviour. In order for two entities
(historically known as Alice and Bob) to exchange data securely, they must first share a
secret key between them. If Bob wishes to send Alice a message, he uses the secret key
with the encryption algorithm to encrypt the message. He sends the encrypted message
(called the ciphertext) to Alice, and she uses the secret key with the decryption algorithm
to decrypt the ciphertext and recover the original message. Since an eavesdropper (Eve)
does not know the secret key, she should not be able to determine what the original
message was.
A physical analogy of a symmetric key scheme is often given in terms of boxes and
padlocks. Suppose Alice and Bob each have a copy of a key for a padlock. If Bob wishes
to send Alice a message, he writes the message on a piece of paper and places it in a
box. He then uses his copy of the key to lock the box with the padlock, and he sends
the locked box to Alice. When she receives it, she uses her copy of the key to unlock
the padlock, she opens the box, and she reads the message. If Eve finds the locked box,
however, she cannot open the padlock because she does not have a copy of the key.
Symmetric key encryption schemes are well-suited to many applications. They tend
to be very efficient in time and space required for their implementation, and they tend
to require only a small amount of key material for a high level of security. The main
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drawback of such schemes has come to be known as the key distribution problem: if
Alice and Bob wish to communicate secretly but have never met, how do they share a
secret key? They cannot send a secret key over an insecure channel because Eve might
be listening and might learn the key; on the other hand, they do not yet share a secure
channel over which to send a secret key. This problem was one of the largest problems
in cryptography for many years. Some solutions might be for Alice and Bob to meet in
person and agree on a key face-to-face (which is of course impractical if they live far away
from one another) or for them to enlist the services of a third party to courier a secret
key between them (which implies they both must trust the third party not to reveal the
key to anyone). Further, for every pair of parties that wishes to communicate secretly,
a unique symmetric key is required; thus the number of symmetric keys in the system
grows rapidly.
In the late 1970 s, the mathematicians Diffie and Hellman introduced a new idea:
public key cryptography [DH76]. (In fact, a British intelligence researcher had discovered
the same idea earlier [Ell70], but his discovery was not made public until later.) Like
the secret key systems described above, a public key scheme has two main algorithms
for encryption and decryption, each of which has an input called a key. The difference
is that the keys used in the two algorithms are not the same. More specifically, Alice
generates two keys of her own: a public key, which she shares with everyone (even her
enemies) and a private key, which she keeps to herself. If Bob wishes to send Alice
a message, he obtains a copy of Alice’s public key, and uses her public key with the
encryption algorithm to encrypt the message. He sends the ciphertext to Alice, and she
uses her private key with the decryption algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext and recover
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the original message. Since Eve does not know Alice’s private key, she should not be
able to determine what the original message was. In other words, anyone can encrypt
a message for Alice, since anyone can obtain Alice’s public key, but once a message is
encrypted for her, only Alice can decrypt it with her private key.
Again, we can illustrate the idea of a public key encryption scheme with a physical
analogy in terms of boxes and padlocks. Suppose Alice has a number of empty boxes, a
number of open padlocks (that can be locked without a key), and a key that opens all of
the padlocks. She freely gives out these boxes and open padlocks to anyone who would
like them. If Bob wishes to send Alice a message, he writes the message on a piece of
paper, gets a box and lock from Alice, and places the message in the box. He then locks
the box with the padlock, and he sends the locked box to Alice. When she receives it,
she uses her key to unlock the padlock, she opens the box, and she reads the message.
If Eve finds the locked box, however, she cannot open the padlock because she does not
have a copy of the key. (After he has locked his message in the box, even Bob cannot
get the message back out!)
The major advantage of these public key schemes is that they provide a solution
to the key distribution problem. Public keys, by design, can be freely distributed to
anyone without compromising the security of the system, so if Alice and Bob wish to
communicate secretly but they have never met before, they need simply obtain one
another’s public keys. There are some disadvantages, in that public key schemes tend
to be less efficient and the keys tend to be larger than in secret key systems, but these
disadvantages are small compared to the advantages provided by such schemes. There are
also ways to use public and secret key schemes together to minimise the disadvantages.
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There are several public key cryptosystems that have been proposed, and many have
been studied in great detail. The study of these cryptosystems includes studying ap-
proaches to breaking them. Breaking a cryptosystem could have many meanings. For
example, given only ciphertext, an attacker might try to determine partial or complete
information about the corresponding original message. Given only an entity’s public key,
an attacker might try to determine partial or complete information about the correspond-
ing private key. There are many variations on the same theme.
Whereas the cryptosystems that are currently in use generally have not been bro-
ken, attackers are constantly developing new attacks and improvements in technology
are helping to speed up current attacks. Especially worrisome to the field of cryptogra-
phy are developments in the area of quantum computing, which we will discuss in the
next chapter. Even though a quantum computer of a sufficient size has not yet been im-
plemented, the theory of quantum computing indicates that many of the cryptosystems
currently in use could easily be broken if this implementation did occur. If a quantum
computer is successfully built, we will therefore have to change the cryptosystems we use
for encrypted communication so that attackers with quantum computers cannot decrypt
it. Further, encrypted messages captured and stored in the past could also be decrypted
by a future quantum attacker. Since there is a definite possibility that one day quantum
computers will become technologically feasible, we need to prepare for that eventuality
by analysing modern cryptosystems with respect to attacks with a quantum computer.
Chapter 2
Introduction To Quantum
Computing
This chapter provides an overview of some aspects of quantum computing. For a more
complete treatment of the history of the subject and many more details on the ideas
discussed in this chapter, see for example [NC00].
2.1 Basic Concepts
The computers that are in widespread use today are sometimes called classical computers.
The behaviour of the elements in these computers can be described by the laws of classical
physics, that is, those laws that were thought to be accurate around the turn of the
twentieth century. However, early in the twentieth century scientists realised that those
laws did not accurately describe the behaviour of all systems. For example, objects on an
7
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atomic scale behaved differently in experiments than was predicted by classical physics.
To more accurately describe these systems, scientists developed a new theory of physics
called quantum physics. This theory includes elements of non-determinism, and it more
accurately models the behaviour of all systems.
With this new model of physics, a new type of computer has emerged: the quantum
computer. A quantum computer is a device that uses the laws of quantum physics to
solve problems. There are many ways in which quantum computers could be imple-
mented, some of which are summarised in [NC00]. This thesis will not be concerned with
specific implementations, but it is important to note that quantum computers have been
implemented successfully, albeit on a small scale. However, regardless of the particular
implementation, the behaviour of a quantum computer is governed by a specific set of
mathematical rules, namely the laws of quantum physics. A quantum computer can
therefore be described completely generally and mathematically.
In a classical computer, information is stored and manipulated in the form of “bits”.
Each bit is represented in the computer by an object that exists in one of two states,
usually referred to as 0 and 1. The computer can manipulate the states of the bits using
various logical operations, and it may examine any bit and determine in which of the two
states the bit currently exists.
In a quantum computer, information is stored and manipulated in the form of quan-
tum bits, or “qubits”. (Initially, qubits and classical bits seem to be completely different
concepts, but as we will see, a bit in a classical computer is really a “restricted” qubit.)
A qubit can exist in one of many different states. More specifically, we think of the state
of a qubit as a unit vector in a two-dimensional complex vector space. As in any vector
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space, we could choose any basis and represent the qubit with respect to that basis.
However, for each quantum system we model, we will choose a convenient orthonormal
basis which we will call the “computational basis”; the computational basis states are
denoted |0〉 and |1〉. In other words, the state of a qubit could be represented as
|φ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉
where α and β are complex numbers. The condition that |φ〉 is a unit vector means that
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Such a linear combination of basis states is often called a superposition.
We cannot examine a qubit directly to determine its exact state (or in other words,
the values α and β). According to the laws of quantum mechanics, when we measure
the qubit, we obtain |0〉 with probability |α|2 and |1〉 with probability |β|2. Further,
when such a measurement is made, the state of the qubit “collapses” from its original
superposition to either |0〉 or |1〉, depending on the outcome of the measurement. Apart
from the measurement operation, we will restrict our attention to operations that treat
the quantum computer as a closed system; that is, we will assume that no information
about the state of the system is “leaked” to the apparatus or to an external system.
As we will see in Section 2.3, however, we can manipulate superposition states without
extracting information from them. This fact allows us to perform operations that are im-
possible to implement with a classical computer (even a probabilistic classical computer).
For example, as a state is manipulated, the amplitudes of each of the basis states can
interfere with each other: two amplitudes of the same sign can combine constructively
to increase the probability associated with a particular measurement outcome, or two
amplitudes of opposite sign can combine destructively to decrease this probability. The
existence of these quantum interference effects is one of the main differences between
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quantum and classical computers.
Despite these apparent differences, bits and qubits both model a physical system
with two orthogonal states. The bits in a classical computer are essentially restricted
qubits in that they do not exist in superposition states for long periods of time: they
are continually leaking information about their states to external systems. The problems
of maintaining coherent superposition states and preventing the computer from coupling
with external systems are some of the main challenges that scientists must overcome
when implementing a quantum computer.
2.2 Hilbert Space
As described above, we can model the state of a qubit as a vector in a two-dimensional
complex vector space. In fact, the state of any quantum mechanical system can be
modeled as a vector inside a special kind of vector space called a Hilbert space. For the
purposes of this thesis we will restrict our attention to Hilbert spaces of finite dimension,
but to describe general quantum systems we need to consider infinite-dimensional spaces.
We briefly define a Hilbert space here; for a more complete description the reader may
consult for example [Per95]:
Definition 2.1. A vector space H is called a Hilbert space if it satisfies the following
three properties:
1. For any vectors u, v ∈ H and any scalars α, β ∈ C, αu+ βv ∈ H.
2. For any vectors u, v ∈ H there exists a complex number 〈u , v 〉 (known as the inner
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product of u and v) the value of which is linear in the first component. Further,
〈u , v 〉 and 〈 v , u 〉 are complex conjugates of one another, and 〈 u , u 〉 ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if u = 0.
3. Let {um} be an infinite sequence of vectors in H and define the norm of u by
‖u‖ = √〈 u , u 〉. If ‖um − un‖ → 0 as m,n → ∞ then there is a unique u ∈ H
such that ‖um − u‖ → 0 as m → ∞. (In other words, any Cauchy sequence of
vectors in the space has a limit which is also a vector in the space.)
This last property is known as the completeness property, and it is satisfied by every
finite dimensional complex vector space equipped with an inner product. Thus in finite
dimensions, every complex inner product space is a Hilbert space [NC00]. (This fact is
not true in infinite dimensions.)
Suppose we have two quantum systems, the states of which can be modeled by vectors
|φ〉 ∈ Hm and |ψ〉 ∈ Hn (where Hm and Hn are Hilbert spaces of dimension m and n,
respectively). To describe the joint state of these systems, we use the “tensor product”
of |φ〉 and |ψ〉, denoted |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 or simply |φ〉 |ψ〉. This new vector is an element of a
larger Hilbert space denoted Hm ⊗ Hn (which is in fact defined as the set of all linear
combinations of tensor products |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 with |φ〉 ∈ Hm and |ψ〉 ∈ Hn).
By definition, a tensor product over two vector spaces V and W must satisfy the
following properties for all v, v′ ∈ V , w,w′ ∈W , and α ∈ C:
1. α(v ⊗ w) = (αv)⊗ w = v ⊗ (αw).
2. (v + v′)⊗ w = v ⊗ w + v′ ⊗ w.
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3. v ⊗ (w + w′) = v ⊗ w + v ⊗ w′.
Also, if A is a linear operator on V and B is a linear operator on W , then we can
define the linear operator A⊗ B on V ⊗W by
(A⊗B)(v ⊗ w) = Av ⊗ Bw
for all v ∈ V and w ∈W .
With these definitions, we are ready to describe more of the basic concepts behind
quantum computing.
2.3 Single-Qubit Gates
In a classical computer, we perform computation using circuits of gates connected by
wires that carry the bits between the gates. An example of a simple gate in a classical
computer is the NOT gate, which maps 0 to 1 and 1 to 0. An analogous gate in a
quantum computer would map |0〉 to |1〉 and |1〉 to |0〉. The laws of quantum mechanics
state that if we are working in a closed system, we should define the gate’s behaviour on
a superposition by extending its behaviour on the basis states linearly. In other words,
the quantum NOT gate maps
α |0〉+ β |1〉 7−→ β |0〉+ α |1〉 .
Because a quantum gate is a linear operator on the space of quantum states, we
can express it as a matrix with respect to the computational basis. We write the state
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α |0〉+ β |1〉 in vector form as 
α
β

 .
The NOT gate can then be represented by a matrix X such that for any α, β ∈ C with
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1,
X

α
β

 =

β
α

 .
Thus we must have
X =

0 1
1 0

 .
Any quantum gate that acts on a single qubit can similarly be expressed as a 2 × 2
matrix. However, the converse is not true: every 2 × 2 matrix does not define a valid
quantum gate. The input and output of a quantum gate are both quantum states, which
as mentioned previously are unit vectors in a two-dimensional complex vector space.
Thus any quantum gate must be an operator that maps all unit vectors to unit vectors in
this vector space; such an operator is called a unitary operator. An equivalent definition
of a unitary operator says that U is unitary if and only if U†U = I, where U† represents
the conjugate transpose of U, and I represents the identity operator. It is in fact true
that any unitary operator does define a “valid” quantum gate, although not every unitary
operation can be performed efficiently in every quantum system; so many of these gates
cannot be implemented efficiently.
The unitarity condition on quantum gates implies another important aspect of quan-
tum computation: if we assume that our system is closed, quantum computation is
“reversible”. Since the inverse of any unitary operator is also unitary, the inverse opera-
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tion of a quantum gate is also a quantum gate, and hence given the output of a gate U
we can recover the input by applying the valid gate U†.
We will mention two more important single-qubit gates at this time. First, the
Hadamard gate is defined by the matrix
H =
1√
2

1 1
1 −1

 ,
and maps |0〉 to 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |1〉 to 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉). Second, the phase gate is defined
for any angle θ by the matrix
Rθ =

1 0
0 eiθ

 .
This gate leaves the state |0〉 unchanged and maps |1〉 to eiθ |1〉. It is easy to see that
these matrices are unitary, since H−1 = H† = H and R−1θ = R
†
θ = R−θ.
2.4 Multiple-Qubit Gates
We can extend the definition of quantum gates to act on n qubits at once. The state of n
qubits can be represented as a unit vector in a 2n-dimensional complex vector space, and
again, the only condition on an n-qubit gate is that it must be a unitary operator on this
vector space. An example of such a gate is the controlled-NOT (or CNOT) gate, whose
two inputs are usually called the control and target qubits. The gate can be described
as follows:
1. if the control qubit is |0〉, the target qubit is not modified, and
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2. if the control qubit is |1〉, the NOT gate is applied to the target qubit.
There is an interesting result that emphasises the importance of the CNOT gate in
quantum computation: any multiple-qubit gate may be constructed using only CNOT
gates and single-qubit gates [BBC+95].
In a similar fashion we can extend any single-qubit gate to a controlled two-qubit
gate. For example, the controlled-Rθ gate works as follows:
1. if the control qubit is |0〉, the target qubit is not modified, and
2. if the control qubit is |1〉, the Rθ gate is applied to the target qubit.
In other words, the gate leaves all of the computational basis states unchanged, except
for |1〉 |1〉, which it maps to eiθ |1〉 |1〉.
Chapter 3
Introduction To Quantum
Algorithms
An algorithm describes a way to solve a particular problem. For example, to solve
the problem of dividing one number into another, we could use the algorithm of long
division, which consists of many steps that are repeated until we obtain the quotient and
remainder. In this section we will present several problems, and describe ways to solve
them that involve preparing specific quantum states and applying to them some of the
quantum gates defined in Chapter 2. By examining and measuring the output of certain
sequences of quantum gates, we can solve a variety of problems.
The quantum algorithms that we present in this chapter are the main tools that we
will use in later chapters to analyse classical public key cryptosystems in a quantum
setting. As we will see later, many of the cryptosystems we use today are less secure
against attacks with a quantum computer since the problems on which these systems are
17
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based can be solved in polynomial time with quantum algorithms from this chapter.
3.1 Deutsch’s Problem
Consider the following problem, posed in [Deu85]:
Problem 3.1 (Deutsch’s Problem (DP)). Given a function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} de-
termine f(0) ⊕ f(1) using only a single evaluation of the function f , where ⊕ is the
componentwise XOR operation.
In other words, we wish to determine with a single evaluation of f whether or not f
is a constant function: if f(0) ⊕ f(1) = 0 then f(0) = f(1) so f is constant, and if
f(0)⊕ f(1) = 1 then f(0) 6= f(1) so f is not constant.
If we consider this problem classically, it is impossible to solve: we can determine
f(0) or f(1), but without knowing both we cannot solve the problem. (In fact, we
cannot determine any information whatsoever that would help us to guess the solution
correctly with probability greater than 1
2
.) However, if we consider the problem in a
quantum setting and we are given a way to reversibly compute f , we can solve it. The
solution originally proposed by Deutsch in [Deu85] was modified and improved slightly
in [CEMM98] and it is this modified solution that we present here.
To perform a “quantum version” of f , we will use an additional qubit (since for a
constant function f , the mapping |x〉 7−→ |f(x)〉 is not reversible). A typical choice for a
reversible implementation of f is the two-qubit unitary operator Uf which performs the
transformation
|x〉 |y〉 7−→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉
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for x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose that we initialise the second qubit to the state 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). When we apply
Uf to the qubits, by the linearity of quantum operators as discussed above,
Uf
(
|x〉 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)) = |x〉 1√
2
(|0⊕ f(x)〉 − |1⊕ f(x)〉)
= |x〉 (−1)f(x) 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
=
(
(−1)f(x) |x〉) 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
Therefore, if we also initialise the first qubit to the state 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) before applying
Uf we obtain
Uf
(
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉))
= 1√
2
(−1)f(0) |0〉 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)+ 1√
2
(−1)f(1) |1〉 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
= 1√
2
(
(−1)f(0) |0〉+ (−1)f(1) |1〉) 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
Now we apply the Hadamard gate to the first qubit above:
H
(
1√
2
(
(−1)f(0) |0〉+ (−1)f(1) |1〉))
= 1
2
(−1)f(0)(|0〉+ |1〉)+ 1
2
(−1)f(1)(|0〉 − |1〉)
= 1
2
(
(−1)f(0) + (−1)f(1)) |0〉+ 1
2
(
(−1)f(0) − (−1)f(1)) |1〉
= (−1)f(0) |f(0)⊕ f(1)〉 .
Apart from the global “phase” of (−1)f(0) that precedes it, the qubit’s state is the correct
solution to the problem. Luckily, the laws of quantum physics tell us that the global phase
will not affect the outcome of any measurement we perform on the state, and so we can
simply measure this qubit and recover the solution f(0)⊕ f(1).
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We can summarise the quantum algorithm for Deutsch’s Problem as follows:
Algorithm 3.2 (Solution To DP).
1. Begin with two qubits initialised to the states 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
2. Apply the two-qubit quantum gate Uf to the system.
3. Apply the Hadamard gate H to the first qubit.
4. Measure the first qubit and obtain the integer y.
5. Return y.
3.2 The Hidden Subgroup Problem
Deutsch’s problem is actually a special case of a more general problem:
Problem 3.3 (The Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)). Let f be a function from
a finitely generated group G to a finite set X such that f is constant on the cosets of a
subgroup K of G and distinct on each coset. Given a quantum network for evaluating f
(namely Uf : |x〉 |y〉 → |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉) find a generating set for K.
In Deutsch’s problem we had G = Z2 = {0, 1}. Using the language of HSP,
1. if f is a constant function, we have K = {0, 1} since f is constant on K (and there
is only one coset of K, namely K itself); and
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2. if f is not constant, then we have K = {0}, since f is constant on K and on
K + 1 = {1}, and distinct on these two cosets.
Thus to solve Deutsch’s problem we wish to determine whether K = {0, 1} or K = {0}.
There are many other problems that can be thought of as special cases of HSP. We
list two important examples below, and for many more, see [Mos99].
Problem 3.4 (The Order Finding Problem (OFP)). Given an element a of a fi-
nite group H, find r, the order of a.
Let f : Z → H be defined by f(x) = ax. Then note that
f(x) = f(y)⇐⇒ ax = ay
⇐⇒ ax−y = 1
⇐⇒ x− y ∈ {t · r : t ∈ Z}.
That is, f(x) = f(y) if and only if x and y are in the same coset of the hidden subgroup
K = rZ of Z. By finding a generator for K we can determine r. Thus OFP is a special
case of HSP.
Problem 3.5 (The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Given an element a of
a finite group H and b = ak, find k. (This k is called the discrete logarithm of b to the
base a.)
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Suppose the order of a is r. Let f : Zr × Zr → H be defined by f(x1, x2) = ax1bx2 .
Then note that
f(x1, x2) = f(y1, y2)⇐⇒ ax1bx2 = ay1by2
⇐⇒ ax1−y1bx2−y2 = 1
⇐⇒ ax1−y1ak(x2−y2) = 1
⇐⇒ (x1 − y1) + k(x2 − y2) = 0 (in Zr)
⇐⇒ (x1, x2)− (y1, y2) ∈ {(−tk, t) : t ∈ Zr}.
That is, f(x1, x2) = f(y1, y2) if and only if (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) are in the same coset of
the hidden subgroup K = 〈(−k, 1)〉 of Zr × Zr. By finding a generator for K we can
determine k. Thus DLP is a special case of HSP.
We mention these two problems in particular because as we will see in the remainder
of this thesis, if we have algorithms to solve these problems efficiently, we can break
many of the classical cryptosystems that are in widespread use today. There do exist
polynomial-time quantum algorithms that solve these problems, and we will discuss these
algorithms later. In fact, there exist efficient quantum algorithms that solve the general
HSP when the group G is Abelian, as described in [Mos99]. Some work has been done
to design algorithms for HSP in non-Abelian groups, although success has been limited.
For example, an efficient algorithm was presented in [Ey00] that is able to determine
some information about the generator of a hidden subgroup in a dihedral group, but
there is no known way to recover the subgroup in polynomial time from this information.
In [IMS01] some special cases of the problem were solved in non-Abelian groups, but the
general case still remains open.
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We now introduce one of the most important ingredients in many quantum algorithms:
the Quantum Fourier Transform.
3.3 The Quantum Fourier Transform
The Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) provides a way to estimate parameters that are
encoded in a specific way in the phases and amplitudes of quantum states. We will begin
with a small three-qubit example, and then define the general QFT.
Assume a is an integer, 0 ≤ a < 8. Now suppose that we are given the three-qubit
state (|0〉+ e2πia2 |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πia4 |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πia8 |1〉)
(ignoring the normalisation factors) and we wish to find a.
We can write a = 4a2 +2a1 + a0 where each aj ∈ {0, 1} and then rewrite the state as
(|0〉+ e2πi(a02 ) |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πi( 2a1+a04 ) |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πi( 4a2+2a1+a08 ) |1〉).
Recall the Hadamard gate H from Section 2.3 and note that ignoring normalisation
factors we could equivalently define it by the map
|x〉 −→ |0〉+ e2πix2 |1〉
for x ∈ {0, 1}. So if we apply H−1 = H to the first qubit, we obtain |a0〉.
Next, we will try to determine a1. Consider the following two cases:
1. If a0 = 0, the second qubit is actually in the state |0〉+ e2πi(
a1
2
) |1〉.
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2. If a0 = 1, the second qubit is in the state |0〉 + e2πi(
2a1+1
4
) |1〉. In this case, if we
apply a R−pi
2
gate to the qubit, we get
|0〉+ e2πi( 2a1+14 )e−ipi2 |1〉
= |0〉+ e2πi(a12 ) |1〉 .
Thus we will obtain a common state if we can decide, based on the state of the first
qubit, whether or not to apply a R−pi
2
gate to the second qubit. In other words, we wish
to apply a controlled-R−pi
2
gate to the first and second qubits. After this gate has been
applied, our second qubit will be in the state |0〉 + e2πi(a12 ) |1〉, and we can apply an H
gate to the second qubit to obtain the state |a1〉.
Similarly, if we now apply a controlled-R−pi
4
to the first and third qubits, the third
qubit will be in the state |0〉 + e2πi( 2a2+a14 ) |1〉. Then, applying a controlled-R−pi
2
to the
second and third qubits will put the third qubit into the state |0〉 + e2πi(a22 ) |1〉. Finally,
we can apply an H gate to the third qubit to obtain |a2〉.
The sequence of gates we have described, illustrated in Figure 3.1, implements the
transformation
(|0〉+ e2πia2 |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πia4 |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πia8 |1〉) −→ |a0〉 |a1〉 |a2〉
and by reversing the order of the qubits, we obtain the 3-qubit state
|a2〉 |a1〉 |a0〉 = |a〉 .
We can generalise this quantum circuit so that if a is an integer with 0 ≤ a < 2n and
a = 2n−1an−1 + 2n−2an−2 + · · ·+ 2a1 + a0 for aj ∈ {0, 1}, we can start with the n-qubit
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Figure 3.1: A 3-qubit Quantum Fourier Transform
state (|0〉+ e2πia2 |1〉)(|0〉+ e2πia4 |1〉) · · · (|0〉+ e2πi a2n |1〉) (3.1)
and transform it into the state
|an−1〉 |an−2〉 · · · |a1〉 |a0〉 = |a〉 .
As pointed out in [Mos99], the start state (3.1) can be rewritten as
2n−1∑
x=0
e2πix
a
2n |x〉 .
The states of this form, for a = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1 are called the Fourier basis states. The
transformation we have discussed in this section therefore maps a state in the Fourier
basis to its corresponding state in the computational basis. We call this transformation
the inverse QFT; the QFT therefore maps states from the computational basis to the
Fourier basis.
We can define the QFT more generally as follows:
Definition 3.6. For any integer m > 1, the m-bit Quantum Fourier Transform QFTm
acts on the vector space generated by the states
|0〉 , |1〉 , . . . , |m− 1〉
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and maps
|a〉 7−→ 1√
m
m−1∑
x=0
e2πix
a
m |x〉 .
We have described an efficient implementation of QFTm in the case where m is
a power of 2, as originally presented in [Cop94]. There are also efficient exact im-
plementations of QFTm in the case where the prime factors of m are distinct and in
O(logm) [Sho94], or more generally when the prime factors are not necessarily distinct
but still in O(logm) [Cle94]. It was shown in [Kit95] that for arbitrary values of m
we can approximate QFTm efficiently; very recently, it was shown that we can in fact
implement QFTm exactly for arbitrary values of m [MZ03].
We now make some important observations about the QFT. First, if we start in the
state |0〉 and apply QFTm we obtain the state
1√
m
m−1∑
x=0
e2πix
0
m |x〉
=
1√
m
m−1∑
x=0
|x〉
which is an equally weighted superposition of the m computational basis states.
Also, given the state |φ〉 = 1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 e
2πixω |x〉 where ω = a
m
for some integer a, then
by definition, if we apply the inverse QFT to |φ〉 we will obtain the state |a〉 and we can
recover ω exactly. If, on the other hand, ω is any real number, we can still use the inverse
QFT to obtain an estimate of ω, and we can bound the distance of this estimate from
the true value of ω. More precisely:
Theorem 3.7. Given an integer m > 0 and the state |φ〉 = 1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 e
2πixω |x〉, where ω
is an any real number, applying QFT−1m to |φ〉 and measuring the result yields an integer
y satisfying the following conditions:
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• If ω = a
m
for some integer a, then with probability 1, y = a.
• Otherwise, with probability at least 8
π2
,
∣∣ y
m
− ω∣∣ ≤ 1
m
.
For a proof of this theorem, see [Che03].
3.4 Solving A Special Case Of The Hidden Subgroup
Problem
We first consider the task of solving HSP where G = Z; that is, f is a function from Z
to some finite set X, and f(x) = f(y) if and only if x− y ∈ rZ for some fixed (unknown)
integer r. We will call this special case of HSP the Integer Hidden Subgroup Problem
(IHSP).
We choose an integer n ≥ log |X| and an integer m which is a power of 2, and we are
given the unitary operatorUf which acts on Hm⊗Hn and maps |x〉 |y〉 7−→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉.
We can then implement the following algorithm, which will form the core of an algorithm
to solve IHSP:
Algorithm 3.8 (Core Of Solution To IHSP).
1. Start in the state |0〉 |0〉 ∈ Hm ⊗Hn.
2. Apply QFTm to the first register.
3. Apply Uf to the system.
4. Apply QFT−1m to the first register.
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5. Measure the first register to obtain the integer y.
6. Return y.
We now have the following well-known result (see for example [NC00]):
Proposition 3.9. After Step 3 of Algorithm 3.8, our system is in the state
|φ〉 = 1√
rm
r−1∑
k=0
(
m−1∑
x=0
e2πix
k
r |x〉
)
|ψk〉
where |ψk〉 = 1√r
r−1∑
j=0
e−2πij
k
r |f(j)〉.
Proof. After Step 2 of Algorithm 3.8, our system is in the state 1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 |x〉 |0〉, and
applying Uf in Step 3 produces the state
1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 |x〉 |f(x)〉. We will show that this
state is in fact equal to |φ〉. Note that
|φ〉 = 1
r
√
m
r−1∑
k=0
(
m−1∑
x=0
e2πix
k
r |x〉
)
r−1∑
j=0
e−2πij
k
r |f(j)〉
=
1
r
√
m
m−1∑
x=0
r−1∑
j=0
(
r−1∑
k=0
e2πi
k
r
(x−j)
)
|x〉 |f(j)〉 . (3.2)
Now fix x and j, and consider the coefficients ck = e
2πi k
r
(x−j) for 0 ≤ k < r. There
are two cases:
1. If x ≡ j (mod r) then k
r
(x − j) is an integer for all k, so each of the ck is 1, and
the sum of the ck is r. In this case, we say that there is constructive interference
between the coefficients.
2. If x 6≡ j (mod r), consider c1 = e2πi 1r (x−j). Note that c r1 − 1 = 0, and since
c r1 − 1 = (c1 − 1)(1 + c1 + · · · + c r−11 ) and c1 − 1 6= 0, it must be true that
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1+ c1+ · · ·+ c r−11 = 0. Furthermore, c k1 = ck for 0 ≤ k < r, so the sum of the ck is
0. In this case we say that there is destructive interference between the coefficients.
Thus from (3.2), we see that
|φ〉 = 1
r
√
m
m−1∑
x=0
r−1∑
j=0
(
r−1∑
k=0
ck
)
|x〉 |f(j)〉
=
1
r
√
m
m−1∑
x=0
|x〉 r |f(x mod r)〉
=
1√
m
m−1∑
x=0
|x〉 |f(x)〉
since by the periodicity of f , f(x) = f(x mod r). Therefore the result is proven.
So after Step 3 our system is in the state 1√
m
∑r−1
k=0
(∑m−1
x=0 e
2πix k
r |x〉) |ψk〉. Letting
ω = k
r
, by Theorem 3.7 and by linearity we can see that with probability at least 8
π2
,
applying QFT−1m to the first register and measuring the result yields an integer yk such
that
∣∣ yk
m
− k
r
∣∣ ≤ 1
m
, where k is chosen at random from {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}.
We will now make use of a theorem from the theory of continued fractions. Given any
real number λ, we can use the theory of continued fractions to compute a sequence of
rational numbers called “convergents” that approximate λ with increasing precision. If λ
is positive and rational (say λ = x
m
for positive integers x and m) we have the following
result (see for example [Ros93]):
Theorem 3.10. Let x, m, k, and r be positive integers, with∣∣∣∣ xm − kr
∣∣∣∣ < 12r2
Then k
r
appears as a convergent in the continued fraction expansion of x
m
.
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There exist efficient algorithms to compute the continued fraction expansion of x
m
, as
described for example in [Kob94]. Clearly there exists at most one fraction a
b
with b ≤ r
such that
∣∣ x
m
− a
b
∣∣ ≤ 1
2r2
, so when we find such a convergent a
b
, we know that a
b
= k
r
and
we can stop computing convergents. The continued fractions algorithms guarantee that
we will have to compute at most O(logm) convergents before we can stop.
So by setting x equal to our measurement output yk and running these algorithms,
provided we have chosen m > 2r2, we can efficiently find a fraction a
b
= k
r
.
Combining Algorithm 3.8 and Theorem 3.10, we obtain an efficient probabilistic quan-
tum algorithm to solve IHSP if we have a bound on the size of r:
Algorithm 3.11 (Solution To IHSP When r Is Bounded).
1. Choose an integer m > 2r2.
2. Repeat Algorithm 3.8 two times to obtain two values yk1, yk2.
3. Use the continued fractions algorithm to obtain fractions a1
b1
, a2
b2
such that
b1, b2 ≤
√
m
2
and
∣∣∣∣yk1m − a1b1
∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣yk2m − a2b2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1m.
If two such fractions cannot be found, return FAIL.
4. Let t = lcm(b1, b2). If t >
√
m
2
, return FAIL.
5. If f(0) 6= f(t), return FAIL.
6. Return t.
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Theorem 3.12. Algorithm 3.11 finds the correct value of r with probability at least 32
π4
.
If it does not return FAIL, it returns a multiple of r.
Proof. We run Algorithm 3.8 twice independently, obtaining results yk1 and yk2 . The
values
yk1
m
and
yk2
m
are estimates of k1
r
and k2
r
, respectively.
By Theorem 3.7,
∣∣yki
m
− ki
r
∣∣ ≤ 1
m
with probability at least 8
π2
for i = 1, and indepen-
dently for i = 2. The probability that the inequality is satisfied for both i = 1 and i = 2
is therefore at least 64
π4
. If this is the case, then since m > 2r2, by Theorem 3.10 the
continued fractions algorithm will successfully find fractions a1
b1
and a2
b2
that satisfy the
conditions in Step 3. Thus with probability at least 64
π4
we will have found ai
bi
= ki
r
for
i = 1, 2.
Now note that gcd(ki, r) is not necessarily 1 because
ai
bi
could be the reduced form of
ki
r
. It is true however that bi =
r
gcd(ki,r)
, so lcm(b1, b2) =
r
gcd(k1,k2,r)
. If, whenever we have
measured a 0 we replace it by r (for mathematical convenience) we can treat k1 and k2
as having been selected uniformly at random from the integers between 1 and r; so k1
and k2 are coprime with probability at least
1
2
[CEMM98]. In this case, lcm(b1, b2) = r
as desired. Thus the algorithm finds the correct value of r with probability at least(
64
π4
) (
1
2
)
= 32
π4
.
The final test in Step 5 checks to make sure that t is a multiple of r. Thus the
algorithm either returns FAIL or a multiple of r.
If we do not have a bound on r to begin with, we can guess at an initial value of
m, and repeat Algorithm 3.11 three times, say. If all three repetitions return FAIL, we
can assume that our m is not large enough, double it, and try again. Eventually, we will
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obtain an m > 2r2, and with high probability, one of the repetitions of the algorithm for
that value of m will succeed. The number of iterations of this process that are required
to ensure m > 2r2 is polynomial in log r.
Thus we have an efficient quantum algorithm to solve IHSP. It should be noted that
if f is given to us as a “black box”, there is no efficient classical algorithm to solve IHSP:
it is a problem for which an efficient quantum algorithm exists but for which no known
efficient classical algorithm exists.
3.5 Solving The Order Finding Problem
Given an element a of a group H , to solve OFP we must compute r, the order of a. As
illustrated in Problem 3.4, OFP is a special case of IHSP where f(x) = ax. Thus, the
algorithm we have described in Section 3.4 allows us to solve OFP in polynomial time.
A polynomial-time quantum algorithm to solve OFP was first proposed in [Sho94].
3.6 Solving The Factoring Problem
In this section, we describe how to find a non-trivial factor of an integer in polynomial
time using a quantum computer. Given a polynomial-time algorithm to solve OFP we can
use a classical reduction to develop an algorithm that allows us to find a non-trivial factor
of an integer in polynomial time. This reduction was first described by Miller in [Mil76].
The idea of solving the factoring problem using the polynomial-time quantum algorithm
for OFP and Miller’s reduction was proposed in [Sho94]. The resulting quantum factoring
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algorithm has become the most famous quantum algorithm.
We present a sketch of Miller’s reduction. Suppose we wish to factor a positive integer
n. First, we assume that n is odd, since factors of 2 are easy to detect. We also assume
that n is not a prime power, since there are efficient classical algorithms to determine
the factors of n in this case. Consider the following algorithm:
Algorithm 3.13 (Finding A Non-Trivial Factor).
1. Choose an integer a at random from {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Let s = gcd(a, n). If s > 1 then return s. Otherwise, a ∈ Z∗n. (Recall that Z∗n is
the multiplicative group of all integers (modulo n) that are coprime with n.)
3. Apply Algorithm 3.11 three times with m > 2n2 to attempt to determine the order
of a in Z∗n. If all three results are FAIL, return FAIL. Otherwise, take r to be the
minimum non-FAIL output.
4. If r is odd, return FAIL.
5. Let t = gcd(ar/2 − 1, n). If t = 1, return FAIL.
6. Return t.
Theorem 3.14. Algorithm 3.13 correctly returns a non-trivial factor of n with probabil-
ity at least 1
3
.
Proof. For any integer a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} which is coprime with n and whose order in
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Z∗n is r, we know that
ar ≡ 1 (mod n)
ar − 1 ≡ 0 (mod n)
(ar/2 − 1)(ar/2 + 1) ≡ 0 (mod n) (if r is even).
Since r is the order of a, we know that ar/2 − 1 6≡ 0 (mod n). So if
1. r is even, and
2. ar/2 + 1 6≡ 0 (mod n),
then t = gcd(ar/2 − 1, n) must be a non-trivial factor of n.
We now show that a randomly selected a satisfies both of these conditions with
probability at least 1 − (1
2
)k−1, where k is the number of distinct odd prime factors of
n. Let n =
∏k
i=1 p
ei
i where the pi are distinct odd primes, and let ri be the order of a in
Z∗
p
ei
i
. Then r is the least common multiple of the ri. Consider the multiplicity of 2 in the
prime factorisation of each ri.
1. If each of these multiplicities is 0 (ie. each ri is odd) then r is odd.
2. If each of these multiplicities is larger than 0 but they are all equal, then ri does
not divide r
2
for any i, and thus it must be true that ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod peii ) for each
i. Then by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, ar/2 ≡ −1 (mod n).
3. Otherwise, there is some i for which ar/2 ≡ 1 (mod paii ) and thus ar/2 6≡ −1
(mod n).
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Thus a randomly selected a will fail to satisfy both required conditions if and only
if the multiplicities of 2 in the prime factorisations of the ri are all the same. By the
Chinese Remainder Theorem, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Z∗n and the
set {(x1, . . . , xk) : xi ∈ Z∗peii , 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Thus selecting an a at random from Z
∗
n is
the same as selecting a k-tuple at random from the above set. For each i, Z∗
p
ei
i
is cyclic
since pi is odd; so if we choose a random element xi with order ri, the probability of
obtaining a particular multiplicity of 2 in the prime factorisation of ri is at most
1
2
. Thus
the probability of obtaining the same multiplicity for each i is at most (1
2
)k−1. In other
words, the probability of choosing an appropriate a is at least
1− (1
2
)k−1
. (3.3)
If such an a is chosen, the algorithm will succeed in finding a non-trivial factor of n
provided that at least one of the applications of Algorithm 3.11 is successful in correctly
determining r, the order of a in Z∗n. By Theorem 3.12 each individual application of
Algorithm 3.11 succeeds with probability at least 32
π4
. Thus the probability that at least
one of them succeeds is
1− (1− ( 32
π4
))3
> 2
3
. (3.4)
Combining (3.3) and (3.4), we see that the probability that the entire algorithm
succeeds is at least (
1− (1
2
)k−1) (2
3
)
.
Since we have assumed n is not a prime power, k ≥ 2. Thus the probability of success is
at least
(
1
2
) (
2
3
)
> 1
3
.
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By applying this algorithm recursively, we can split n into its prime factors. We
therefore have a polynomial time probabilistic quantum algorithm to solve the factoring
problem.
The core of this quantum factoring algorithm has been successfully implemented on
a small quantum computer to attempt to factor the integer 15 into its prime factors (3
and 5). Scientists are still only able to tackle problems with small parameter sizes using
the current implementations of quantum computers, but the successful implementation
of this and other quantum algorithms indicates that the theory currently being developed
can actually be applied to a physical realisation of a quantum computer.
3.7 Solving Another Special Case Of The Hidden
Subgroup Problem
Next consider the task of solving HSP where G = Zp × Zp; that is, f is a function from
Zp × Zp to some finite set X, and f(x1, x2) = f(y1, y2) if and only if (x1, x2) and (y1, y2)
are in the same coset of some hidden subgroup K (which is of size p). We will call this
special case of HSP the Prime Hidden Subgroup Problem (PHSP). In this section we will
present a sketch of a well-known algorithm to solve this special case; the algorithm is a
generalisation of Algorithm 3.8 and can be found also in [NC00], for example.
We choose an integer n ≥ log |X|. We use the natural generalisation of the definition
of Uf ; that is, Uf implements the unitary transformation
|x〉 |y〉 |z〉 −→ |x〉 |y〉 |z ⊕ f(x, y)〉 .
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We also assume that we can implement QFTp exactly. In practice we would likely use
an approximation of QFTp, for example by performing QFT2l where 2
l ≈ p; in this case
the algorithm still succeeds with high probability as formalised in [HH99]. However, by
using the methods described in [MZ03] we could instead implement QFTp exactly and
subsequently obtain an exact algorithm for PHSP.
Consider the following algorithm, which will form the core of an algorithm to solve
PHSP:
Algorithm 3.15 (Core Of Solution To PHSP).
1. Start in the state |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 in Hp ⊗Hp ⊗Hn.
2. Apply QFTp to each of the first two registers.
3. Apply Uf to the system.
4. Apply QFT−1p to each of the first two registers.
5. Measure the first two registers and output the ordered pair (s, t).
Define the set T = {(s, t) : su+ tv ≡ 0 (mod p) for every (u, v) ∈ K} . Note that
|T | = p. For each (s, t) ∈ T define the state
∣∣ψ(s,t)〉 = 1√
p
∑
(u,v)∈G/K
e−2πi
su+tv
p |f(u, v)〉 .
(Each (u, v) in the above sum is a representative of one of the cosets of K in G.) We
now prove a result similar to Proposition 3.9:
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Proposition 3.16. After Step 3 of Algorithm 3.15, our system is in the state
|φ〉 = 1
p
√
p
∑
(s,t)∈T
(
p−1∑
x=0
e2πix
s
p |x〉
)(
p−1∑
y=0
e2πiy
t
p |y〉
)∣∣ψ(s,t)〉 .
Proof. After Step 2 of Algorithm 3.15, our system is in the state(
1√
p
p−1∑
x=0
|x〉
)(
1√
p
p−1∑
y=0
|y〉
)
|0〉
and applying Uf in Step 3 produces the state
1
p
∑
(x,y)∈G
|x〉 |y〉 |f(x, y)〉 .
We will show that this state is in fact equal to |φ〉.
Note that
|φ〉 = 1
p2
∑
(s,t)∈T

 ∑
(x,y)∈G
e2πi
sx+ty
p |x〉 |y〉

 ∑
(u,v)∈G/K
e−2πi
su+tv
p |f(u, v)〉
=
1
p2
∑
(x,y)∈G
∑
(u,v)∈G/K

 ∑
(s,t)∈T
e2πi
s(x−u)+t(y−v)
p
(x−j)

 |x〉 |y〉 |f(u, v)〉 (3.5)
Now fix x, y, u, and v, and consider the coefficients c(s,t) = e
2πi s(x−u)+t(y−v)
p for
(s, t) ∈ T . There are two cases:
1. If (x, y) and (u, v) are in the same coset of K, then (x − u, y − v) ∈ K. By the
definition of T , s(x − u) + t(y − v) ≡ 0 (mod p). Thus s(x−u)+t(y−v)
p
is an integer,
each of the c(s,t) is 1, and the sum of the c(s,t) is p. In this case, we say that there
is constructive interference between the coefficients.
2. If (x, y) and (u, v) are in different cosets of K, then using a method similar to that
in the proof of Proposition 3.9 we can show that the sum of the c(s,t) is 0. In this
case we say that there is destructive interference between the coefficients.
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From (3.5) we see that
|φ〉 = 1
p2
∑
(x,y)∈G
∑
(u,v)∈G/K

 ∑
(s,t)∈T
c(s,t)

 |x〉 |y〉 |f(u, v)〉
=
1
p2
∑
(x,y)∈G
|x〉 |y〉 p |f(uˆ, vˆ)〉
where (uˆ, vˆ) is the representative for the coset containing (x, y). Therefore,
|φ〉 = 1
p
∑
(x,y)∈G
|x〉 |y〉 |f(x, y)〉
since by definition f(uˆ, vˆ) = f(x, y). Thus the result is proven.
So after Step 3 our system is in the state
1
p
√
p
∑
(s,t)∈T
(
p−1∑
x=0
e2πix
s
p |x〉
)(
p−1∑
y=0
e2πiy
t
p |y〉
)∣∣ψ(s,t)〉 .
Assuming we can implement QFTp exactly, then we can see intuitively that by apply-
ing QFT−1p to each of the first two registers and measuring the results we will obtain,
respectively, random values s and t such that (s, t) ∈ T .
By running Algorithm 3.15 several times to obtain several random elements of T , we
can use methods from linear algebra to determine a generating set for K. (In fact, in
some special cases, such as the solution to the Discrete Logarithm Problem discussed
below, it is sufficient to run Algorithm 3.15 only once.)
It follows, therefore, that Algorithm 3.15 forms the core of an efficient quantum
algorithm to solve PHSP.
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3.8 Computing Discrete Logarithms
Given a generator a of a group H of order n, and b = ak, to solve DLP we must compute
k. As illustrated in Problem 3.5, DLP in a group of prime order is a special case of
PHSP. Thus, the algorithm from the previous section allows us to solve DLP in a group
of prime order in polynomial time.
If we wish to solve DLP in a group of general order, we can use a slight modification
of the classical Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, which was proposed in [PH78]. In short, given
the prime factorisation n = pe11 · · · peww where the pi are distinct primes, the algorithm
computes ki = k mod p
ei
i for each i, and then uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to
recombine these values into the discrete logarithm k. We modify the original algorithm
in a natural way by using some quantum algorithms as subroutines.
Algorithm 3.17 (Solution to DLP).
1. Apply Algorithm 3.13 recursively to split n into its prime factorisation, say
n = pe11 · · · peww where the pi are distinct primes.
2. For i from 1 to w do the following:
2.1 Set p = pi and e = ei.
2.2 Set γ = 1 and l−1 = 0.
2.3 Compute α = an/p.
2.4 For j from 0 to e− 1 do the following:
Compute γ = γalj−1p
j−1
and β = (bγ−1)n/p
j+1
.
Compute lj = logα β using the quantum algorithm from Section 3.7.
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2.5 Set ki = l0 + l1p+ · · ·+ le−1pe−1.
3. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to combine the ki to determine the discrete
logarithm k.
4. Return k.
The element α computed in each iteration is an element of order p, since an = 1 and
α = an/p. Thus the instance of DLP in Step 2.4 is an instance of DLP in the group 〈α〉,
which is a group of order p. We can therefore indeed apply the quantum algorithm from
Section 3.7 to compute lj . For a proof that the remainder of the algorithm is correct,
see [PH78].
To find a factor of n using Algorithm 3.13 requires time polynomial in log n, and there
are O(log n) factors, so the factoring in Step 1 requires polynomial time. In total, the
number of iterations of the inner loop is
∑w
i=1 ei (which is in O(log n)) and each iteration
uses the efficient quantum algorithm to compute a discrete logarithm. Algorithm 3.17 is
therefore an efficient quantum algorithm to solve DLP.
This quantum algorithm will succeed for any group H , provided that we can effi-
ciently perform the group operation, and that each group element can be represented
by a unique quantum state. (If a single group element can be represented by multiple
quantum states, these quantum states will not interfere with one another as required.)
Of considerable interest is the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, which
is fast becoming an important group in cryptographic applications (see Chapter 6). For
a detailed discussion of quantum circuits for solving DLP in the group of points on an
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elliptic curve over GF (p) see [PZ03]. A polynomial-time quantum algorithm to solve
DLP was first proposed in [Sho94].
This chapter has introduced several quantum algorithms, most importantly algo-
rithms to solve OFP, the factoring problem, and DLP. These algorithms are the main
tools that we will use in the subsequent chapters as we analyse various public key cryp-
tosystems in a quantum setting. Further quantum algorithms that depend on more
specialised concepts will be described as the required definitions and results are intro-
duced.
Chapter 4
The RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem, the first published realisation of a public key cryptosystem, was
proposed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA78]. It is similar to the system
proposed in [Coc73], although that system was not made public until later. Since the late
1970 s, the RSA cryptosystem has become the most widely used public key encryption
scheme in many applications from electronic commerce to national security.
4.1 The Cryptosystem
To generate an RSA key, Alice performs the following steps:
Algorithm 4.1 (RSA Key Generation).
1. Alice selects at random two distinct primes p and q.
2. She calculates n = pq and φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
43
44 CHAPTER 4. THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM
3. She selects some integer e, 1 < e < φ(n), such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1.
4. She computes the unique integer d, 1 < d < φ(n), such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)).
5. Alice’s public key is (n, e), and her private key is d.
To encrypt a message for Alice using the RSA cryptosystem, Bob performs the fol-
lowing steps:
Algorithm 4.2 (RSA Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key (n, e).
2. He converts the message to an integer m, such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
3. Bob computes the encrypted message c = me mod n.
To recover the original message, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 4.3 (RSA Decryption).
1. She uses her private key d and computes m = cd mod n.
Theorem 4.4. RSA decryption works properly.
Proof. First note that since ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n) there exists some integer t such that ed =
1 + tφ(n).
We now have two cases.
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1. If gcd(m, p) = 1,
mp−1 ≡ 1 (mod p) (by Fermat’s Little Theorem)
(mp−1)t(q−1) ≡ 1 (mod p)
m1+tφ(n) ≡ m (mod p).
2. If gcd(m, p) = p,
m ≡ 0 (mod p)
m1+tφ(n) ≡ 0 (mod p).
Thus in both cases, m1+tφ(n) ≡ m (mod p). In a similar way, we can prove that
m1+tφ(n) ≡ m (mod q). Combining these two congruences, since p and q are distinct
primes,
m1+tφ(n) ≡ m (mod n)
med ≡ m (mod n)
cd ≡ m (mod n)
so decryption indeed works properly.
4.2 Security Of The System
The security of the RSA cryptosystem is based on the hardness of the RSA problem,
which is the problem of finding eth roots in the ring Zn = Z/nZ.
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Problem 4.5 (The RSA Problem (RSAP)). Given n, e, and me mod n for some
m ∈ Zn, find m.
Determining the plaintext from an RSA ciphertext is equivalent to solving RSAP,
which is thought to be hard for a classical computer. Alternatively, if Eve can successfully
factor n to recover p and q, she can compute φ(n) and d just as Alice did when she
generated the keys, and obtain complete knowledge of Alice’s private key. It has been
conjectured that these two attacks are computationally equivalent (that is, solving RSAP
is equivalent to factoring n) but this conjecture has not been proven. However, it can be
shown that determining the private key d from the public key (n, e) is indeed equivalent
to factoring n [MvOV96], and most current attacks on the RSA cryptosystem attempt
to factor n.
The problem of factoring integers has been studied in detail for many years; some of
the current known classical factoring algorithms are listed in Table 4.1. Other than the
Algorithm Expected running time
(neglecting logarithmic factors)
Trial division O
(
n1/2
)
Pollard rho O
(
n1/4
)
Quadratic sieve exp
[
O
(
(log n)1/2(log logn)1/2
) ]
Number field sieve exp
[
O
(
(log n)1/3(log logn)2/3
) ]
Table 4.1: Some classical factoring algorithms
trial division algorithm, the algorithms in Table 4.1 are probabilistic algorithms. The
running times presented in the table are upper bounds on the expected running times of
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the algorithms, taken over the random bits used as input. In general, rigorous analysis
of an algorithm leads to an expected running time that is valid for any input. In the case
of the last two algorithms above, however, some additional assumptions on the input are
required in order for the expected running times to be valid; so the estimates are heuristic
ones. (These assumptions are conjectured to hold true for all inputs, but the conjectures
are unproven.) There are also algorithms that have rigorously proven expected running
times of exp
[
O
(
(logn)1/2(log logn)1/2
) ]
, such as the algorithm in [Pom87].
The last two algorithms in Table 4.1 are both “sieving” algorithms, and they operate
on the same basic premise: each of them tries to find positive integers x and y less than
n such that
x2 ≡ y2 (mod n), and
x 6≡ ±y (mod n).
Once two such integers have been found, we know that
(x− y)(x+ y) ≡ 0 (mod n)
and n does not divide either x− y or x+ y. Thus gcd(x− y, n) is a non-trivial factor of
n. As mentioned earlier, these algorithms are randomised: they find congruences of the
desired form by choosing random integers and performing specific series of operations on
them.
Another popular factoring algorithm is the elliptic curve method proposed in [Len87].
This algorithm works especially well when the smallest prime factor of n is much smaller
than
√
n: the algorithm’s expected running time is exp
[
(2 + ε)(log p)1/2(log log p)1/2
]
where p is the smallest prime factor of n and ε → 0 as p → ∞. (This is a heuristic
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estimate.) In general, the two prime factors of an RSA modulus are chosen to be ap-
proximately equal in size, and so the elliptic curve algorithm may not run significantly
faster than the other algorithms in Table 4.1; on the other hand, it requires considerably
less storage space [Kob94].
For more details on these classical factoring algorithms, see for example [Kob94]
or [Coh93].
Because all of these algorithms require superpolynomial time, the RSA cryptosystem
is still considered secure against classical factoring attacks for sufficiently large n. Gen-
erally, a modulus of 1024 bits or more is thought to be secure against today’s computers.
Recent developments in specialised hardware indicate that this modulus length may not
be sufficient for much longer, however: the device proposed in [ST03] would reportedly
cost $10 million and would be capable of factoring a 1024-bit modulus in less than a year.
We do not know of an efficient classical algorithm for factoring; so the RSA cryptosys-
tem may be hard to break with any classical algorithm. However, as we have seen in
Section 3.6, Algorithm 3.13 is a probabilistic polynomial-time quantum algorithm that
solves the factoring problem. Thus the RSA cryptosystem is insecure in a quantum
setting.
It is also interesting to note that given a particular RSA ciphertext c, we can use
a quantum computer to solve RSAP directly; that is, to determine the corresponding
plaintext m without having to factor n [CEMM98]. Since e is relatively prime to φ(n),
we know that m and me = c have the same order, say r. To determine m from c, we
first give c as input to the quantum order-finding algorithm described in Section 3.5, and
obtain r as output. Next we compute the unique a such that ea ≡ 1 (mod r). Finally,
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we compute
ca mod n
= mea mod n
= m
and recover the plaintext m.
Chapter 5
The Rabin Cryptosystem
The Rabin cryptosystem was proposed in [Rab79]. Like the RSA cryptosystem, an adver-
sary can attack the scheme by factoring a product of two large primes. However, unlike
the RSA cryptosystem, it has been proven that performing this factorisation is compu-
tationally equivalent to determining the plaintext corresponding to a given ciphertext.
If we assume that the factoring problem is intractable, then the Rabin cryptosystem is
provably secure against a passive adversary.
5.1 The Cryptosystem
To generate Rabin keys, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 5.1 (Rabin Key Generation).
1. Alice selects two distinct primes p and q.
2. She calculates n = pq.
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3. Alice’s public key is n, and her private key is (p, q).
To encrypt a message for Alice using the Rabin cryptosystem, Bob does the following:
Algorithm 5.2 (Rabin Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key n.
2. He converts the message to an integer m, such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
3. Bob computes the encrypted message c = m2 mod n.
To recover the original message, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 5.3 (Rabin Decryption).
1. She computes the four square roots of c mod n.
2. Somehow, she decides which of the four square roots corresponds to the original
message sent by Bob.
One problem with the Rabin cryptosystem is that in order to recover the original
message, Alice must somehow choose between the four square roots of the ciphertext.
One way to avoid this problem is to include some redundancy in the message before
encrypting it, so that with high probability only one of the four square roots will have
this redundancy.
If p and q are chosen to be congruent to 3 mod 4, there is a simple algorithm to
calculate the four square roots of c:
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Algorithm 5.4 (Computing Square Roots).
1. Alice computes r = c(p+1)/4 mod p and s = c(q+1)/4 mod q.
2. She uses the Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find integers a and b such that
ap+ bq = 1.
3. She calculates x = (aps+ bqr) mod n and y = (aps− bqr) mod n.
4. The four square roots of c are x mod n, −x mod n, y mod n, and −y mod n.
The steps of the algorithm correspond to finding the square roots of c modulo p and
q, and then combining them using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. It is easily verified
that the resulting integers are indeed the four square roots of c. Note that if one or both
of p or q is congruent to 1 mod 4, the square roots can still be efficiently computed, but
the algorithm is more complicated [MvOV96]. For this reason, during the key generation
procedure it makes sense to choose the primes p and q to be congruent to 3 mod 4.
It is also interesting to note as in [MvOV96] that Rabin encryption is more efficient
than RSA encryption, since it requires a single modular squaring operation. (RSA en-
cryption will require more squaring and multiplication operations since the encryption
exponent is always greater than 2.) The efficiencies of the RSA and Rabin decryption
algorithms are comparable.
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5.2 Security Of The System
If an adversary can factor Alice’s modulus n and recover the primes p and q, then the ad-
versary has complete knowledge of Alice’s private key and hence the scheme is broken. As
mentioned previously, in fact it is easy to see that decrypting Rabin ciphertexts is com-
putationally equivalent to the factoring problem. If we can decrypt a Rabin ciphertext,
c, we can find the four square roots of c mod m, say ±x,±y, where y 6≡ ±x (mod n).
Then we know that c ≡ x2 (mod n) and c ≡ y2 (mod n), or in other words, x2 ≡ y2
(mod n). (This congruence is one of the type that the sieving algorithms in Section 4.2
attempt to find.) Then we know that (x − y)(x+ y) ≡ 0 (mod n), so gcd(x − y, n)is a
non-trivial factor of n.
Because of this equivalence, factoring algorithms like the ones mentioned in Chap-
ter 4 are the only available tools for a passive adversary. Since the best known classical
factoring algorithms require superpolynomial time, the scheme is thought to be secure
against a passive classical adversary. However, an adversary with a quantum computer
can factor in polynomial time using Algorithm 3.13. Hence, the Rabin cryptosystem is
not secure in a quantum setting.
Chapter 6
The ElGamal Cryptosystem
The ElGamal cryptosystem was proposed in [ElG85], and is based on the hardness of
the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). It may be used with any finite cyclic group,
although as stated in [MvOV96] in order for the group to be a good choice, it should
satisfy two main criteria:
1. the group operation should be easy to apply so that the cryptosystem is efficient,
and
2. DLP in the group should be computationally infeasible so that the cryptosystem is
secure.
Some examples of groups for which these criteria seem to be met are the multiplicative
group Z∗p of the integers modulo a prime p, and the group of points on an elliptic curve
over a finite field. For more examples of groups where the ElGamal cryptosystem is
thought to be secure, see [MvOV96].
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6.1 The Cryptosystem
To generate ElGamal keys, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 6.1 (ElGamal Key Generation).
1. She selects a cyclic group G that meets the above criteria. Let n denote the order
of G.
2. She finds a generator α of G.
3. Alice selects a random integer a such that 1 ≤ a ≤ n− 1, and computes αa.
4. Her public key is (G, n, α, αa) and her private key is a.
To encrypt a message for Alice using the ElGamal cryptosystem, Bob does the fol-
lowing:
Algorithm 6.2 (ElGamal Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key (G, n, α, αa).
2. He converts his message to an element m ∈ G.
3. He selects a random integer k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
4. Bob computes γ = αk and δ = m(αa)k.
5. The ciphertext is c = (γ, δ).
To decrypt the ciphertext, Alice performs the following steps:
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Algorithm 6.3 (ElGamal Decryption).
1. Alice uses her private key a to compute γa and then γ−a.
2. She computes m = γ−aδ.
Theorem 6.4. ElGamal decryption works properly.
Proof. Note that
γ−aδ = γ−am(αa)k
= mγ−a(αk)a
= mγ−aγa
= m
so decryption indeed works properly.
6.2 Security Of The System
It is clear that an attacker can compute Alice’s private key a by finding the discrete
logarithm of αa to the base α, both of which are public quantities. Also, if the attacker
can find the particular value of k that was used to encrypt a message, she can decrypt
the message, but to determine k she must find the discrete logarithm of γ to the base
α. These facts imply that the security of the scheme depends on the hardness of DLP in
the group G.
58 CHAPTER 6. THE ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
There are many classical algorithms to solve DLP. These algorithms can be divided
into two main categories: algorithms that work in any group G, and algorithms that
depend on a particular group G.
In the first category are algorithms like Shanks’s baby-step giant-step algorithm,
which runs in O
(
n1/2
)
time (ignoring logarithmic factors) [Coh93]. The Pohlig-Hellman
algorithm mentioned in Section 3.8 also works in any group, and it performs especially
well if the factors of n are known and are all small; however, in the worst case it also
requires O
(
n1/2
)
time. In fact, in a “generic” group G of prime order p (that is, a group
where the elements have unique encodings but where the encodings do not reveal any
group structure that algorithms can take advantage of) a lower bound on the complexity
of any classical algorithm to solve DLP is Ω(p1/2) steps [Sho97]. Some algorithms may
take advantage of the structure of a specific group, however, which gives rise to the second
main category of algorithms for DLP.
In this second category are algorithms like the index calculus algorithms, which work
in the multiplicative group of GF (pk), where p is a prime and k is a positive inte-
ger. The index calculus algorithms are similar in structure to the sieving algorithms
for factoring discussed in Section 4.2, and there are methods with a rigorous expected
running time of exp
[
O
(
(log pk)1/2(log log pk)1/2
) ]
. There is also an analogue of the
Number Field Sieve which is slightly more efficient, with an expected running time of
exp
[
O
(
(log pk)1/3(log log pk)2/3
) ]
(although this is a heuristic estimate). Even though
they run in subexponential time, like the best known factoring algorithms, these algo-
rithms for DLP still require superpolynomial time.
However, Algorithm 3.17 requires time polynomial in logn, and thus is an efficient
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quantum algorithm to solve DLP in any group G. The existence of this efficient quantum
algorithm implies that the ElGamal cryptosystem is not secure in a quantum setting: an
attacker could use Algorithm 3.17 to compute Alice’s private key a from her public key
αa. Alternatively, the attacker could use Algorithm 3.17 to determine k from γ for a
particular message and hence decrypt the message by computing δ(αa)−k = m.
Chapter 7
The McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece cryptosystem was proposed in [McE78], and is based on problems in alge-
braic coding theory. To generate a key pair, Alice constructs a linear error-correcting code
that has an efficient decoding algorithm, and then uses some secret parameters to trans-
form it into a different linear code with no apparent efficient decoding algorithm. The
secret parameters that Alice has chosen allow her to perform the inverse transformation
and then use an efficient algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext she receives.
7.1 The Cryptosystem
Before describing the McEliece cryptosystem, we give a brief introduction to the theory
of error-correcting codes. For more information about error-correcting codes and infor-
mation theory see, for example, [McE77]. Originally, coding theory was developed to
allow data to be reliably transmitted through a channel that may distort the data during
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transmission. The idea of an error-correcting code is to introduce a certain amount of
redundancy into the message being transmitted, so that even if errors do occur, they
can be detected and possibly corrected. It should be noted that these codes are not
“encryption schemes”, in that they are not designed to protect the confidentiality of the
data, and they have publicly known encoding and decoding procedures.
Codes can be defined over any set of messages, but for our purposes, we will only
consider binary codes, which use messages constructed from the alphabet Z2 = {0, 1}. If
we wish to send messages of k bits in length, we consider our message space to be the
set of k-tuples with entries from Z2. The idea of a code is to choose some n > k and
define a one-to-one mapping between the message space and a subset of size 2k of the set
of binary n-tuples. This subset is called a code, and the elements of the subset are the
code words. Since there are more bits in each code word than there are in each message,
the code words can carry more information than the messages: namely the redundancy
that we need to achieve the goals stated above.
We begin with some basic definitions.
Definition 7.1. Let x be an n-tuple with entries in Z2. The Hamming weight of x,
denoted w(x), is the number of components of x that are equal to 1.
Definition 7.2. Let x and y be n-tuples with entries in Z2. The distance between x and
y, denoted d(x, y), is the number of components in which x and y differ. Equivalently,
d(x, y) = w(x⊕ y).
We now introduce the concept of a linear code, which is one of the most common
types of error-correcting codes.
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Definition 7.3. Let Vn(Z2) be the n-dimensional vector space consisting of the n-tuples
with entries from Z2. Let k < n. A (k, n) linear binary code is a k-dimensional subspace
of Vn(Z2).
Definition 7.4. Let C be a linear binary code. A generator matrix for C is a k × n
matrix with entries from Z2 whose rows form a basis for C.
Let m be a k-bit (row) vector. The code word corresponding to the message m is the
n-bit (row) vector mG, where G is the generator matrix for the code. When the code
word is transmitted, errors may be introduced by the communication channel or by a
malicious third party, and ideally the receiver will be able to detect and correct these
errors. The decoding procedure (that is, the process of recovering the original message
from the received binary string) may be complicated, and varies depending on the type
of code being used. The codes that are of interest in coding theory are those with which
the receiver can detect and correct a large number of errors relative to the size of the code
words, and for which the decoding procedure is efficient. When describing a code, we
often state its error-correcting capability, which is an integer representing the number of
errors that may be introduced in a transmitted code word without affecting the receiver’s
ability to properly decode the received binary string. We also often state the distance of
the code, which is the minimum distance between any two codewords.
However, there are many linear codes for which there apparently exists no efficient de-
coding procedure. In fact, given a generator matrix for a random subspace of Vn(Z2) the
problem of decoding a received binary string can be shown to beNP-complete [BMvT78].
The security of the McEliece cryptosystem is based on the hardness of this general de-
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coding problem. The cryptosystem uses a specific type of code called a binary Goppa
code.
Definition 7.5. Let GF (2l) denote the finite field with 2l elements. Let G(x) be a poly-
nomial of degree s with coefficients in GF (2l) and let α1, . . . , αn ∈ GF (2l) be chosen such
that G(αi) 6= 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. These parameters define a binary Goppa code in which
c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Vn(Z2) is a codeword if and only if
n∑
i=1
ci(x− αi)−1 ≡ 0 (mod G(x)).
Proposition 7.6. A Goppa code defined as above is a (k, n) linear binary code with
k ≥ n− ls and distance at least s+ 1.
The bounds given in this proposition are not necessarily tight bounds, and many
choices of parameters may result in codes with larger k and larger distances. Goppa
codes are among the classes of codes that are of interest in coding theory because they
have an efficient decoding procedure, which is described in [McE77]. The idea of the
McEliece cryptosystem is to transform a randomly selected binary Goppa code into a
general linear code using some secret parameters. Without knowledge of these secret
parameters, the best decoding procedures for the resulting general code are thought to
require superpolynomial time; with knowledge of the secret parameters, the general code
can be transformed back to a Goppa code, where an efficient decoding procedure does
exist. The cryptosystem is described below.
To generate a McEliece key, Alice performs the following steps:
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Algorithm 7.7 (McEliece Key Generation).
1. Alice constructs a linear t error-correcting Goppa code C with a k × n generator
matrix G.
2. Alice selects a k×k invertible matrix S (called a “scrambling matrix”) and an n×n
permutation matrix P .
3. She computes G¯ = SGP .
4. Alice’s public key is G¯, and her private key is (S,G, P ).
Note that the matrix G¯ is a generator matrix for a general linear code that is related
to C, but for which there is no apparent efficient decoding algorithm.
To encrypt a message for Alice using the McEliece cryptosystem, Bob performs the
following steps:
Algorithm 7.8 (McEliece Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key G¯.
2. He converts the message to a k-bit binary vector m.
3. He selects a random n-bit vector e of weight t.
4. Bob computes the encrypted message c = mG¯⊕ e.
In other words, to encrypt a message, Bob starts with the message vector, computes
the corresponding codeword in the general linear code, and adds a random “error” vector
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to the message. Since the new code has no apparent efficient decoding algorithm, it is
hard for an attacker to correct the error and recover the original message. However, since
Alice knows the matrices S and P she can use them to transform the codeword from this
new code back to the original code, and then use the efficient decoding algorithm for that
code.
In other words, to recover the original message, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 7.9 (McEliece Decryption).
1. She computes cP−1 = (mS)G⊕ eP−1.
2. Since P is a permutation matrix, eP−1 also has weight t. Alice can therefore use
the efficient decoding algorithm for the original Goppa code C to remove the error
eP−1 and recover the codeword mS.
3. She applies S−1 to recover m.
7.2 Security Of The System
The best known classical attack on the McEliece cryptosystem is described in [AM88];
minor improvements to the algorithm have been suggested in [LB89] and others, however
the general idea of the attack remains the same.
Suppose the attacker obtains a ciphertext c = mG¯⊕e. She chooses k components of c,
and uses them to form the shorter vector cˆ. Let the positions of the chosen components be
i1, i2, . . . , ik; so cˆ = (ci1 , ci2, . . . , cik). Let eˆ = (ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eik) denote the corresponding k
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components of e, and let ˆ¯G denote the square matrix formed by taking the corresponding
k columns of G¯. Then
cˆ = m ˆ¯G⊕ eˆ
and provided ˆ¯G is invertible,
(cˆ⊕ eˆ) ˆ¯G−1 = m.
Thus if the k components of eˆ all happen to be 0, the attacker is able to recover m
by computing cˆ ˆ¯G−1 = m. The idea of the attack is to choose various sets of components
until a set is found for which those k components of e are all 0, at which point the message
will be recovered.
It is important for the attacker to have a method to recognise that the correct mes-
sage m has been obtained, especially in cases where the message does not contain any
redundancy; such a method was proposed in [LB89]. The method can be summarised in
the following proposition:
Proposition 7.10. The attack has succeeded (that is, cˆ ˆ¯G−1 = m) if and only if
w(c⊕ cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯) ≤ t, where t is the error-correcting capability of C.
Proof. First consider the case where cˆ ˆ¯G−1 is indeed the true message m. Recall that
c = mG¯⊕ e, so
w(c⊕ cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯) = w(mG¯⊕ e⊕ cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯)
= w(mG¯⊕ e⊕mG¯)
= w(e)
≤ t.
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Next consider the case where cˆ ˆ¯G−1 is not the true message m, but instead some other
binary string m′. Since C can correct t errors, by definition it must have distance greater
than 2t, meaning that the number of components in which any two codewords differ is
greater than 2t. So the codewords corresponding to m and m′ must differ in more than
2t components. That is,
w(mG¯⊕m′G¯) > 2t.
Note that mG¯ = c⊕ e so we have
w(c⊕ e⊕ cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯) > 2t
and since w(e) ≤ t,
w(c⊕ cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯) > t
and the proposition is proven.
Thus the attacker has a method to easily determine when the attack has succeeded:
she can exhaustively search all sets of components until the correct one is found and
the message is recovered. The attack clearly requires time exponential in k. In [LB89],
improvements and generalisations are suggested that improve the running time of the
attack, although only by a polynomial factor.
It is interesting to note that this approach will decode any code, not just one of the
special form used in the McEliece cryptosystem; in other words, this attack solves the
general decoding problem. However, as mentioned above, the general decoding problem
is known to be NP-complete [BMvT78]. It is possible that if a polynomial-time attack
is desired, the special form of a McEliece code will have to be exploited by the attacker.
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In [Hei87] it is shown that determining the plaintext from the ciphertext is polyno-
mially equivalent to determining the Hamming weight of the plaintext. This and other
facts are then used to develop and propose partial attacks on the McEliece cryptosystem
and its variants. The attacks are shown to be generally unsuccessful against the original
cryptosystem, but empirical evidence mentioned in [Hei87] suggests these attacks may be
successful against some variants of the cryptosystem, such as schemes that use a different
class of error correcting codes in the same general way.
Unlike the first cryptosystems we discussed, it is not clear that there is a way to
efficiently break the McEliece cryptosystem using a quantum computer. None of the
algorithms presented in Chapter 3 seem to give a quantum attacker any advantage over a
classical one. The hard problem on which the idea for the cryptosystem is based, namely
the decoding of an arbitrary linear code, does not seem to fit well into the Hidden
Subgroup Problem framework, and so it is unlikely that any of the algorithms we have
discussed will be helpful to the attacker in developing a polynomial-time attack on the
scheme.
However, we could use a different quantum algorithm to speed up the best known
classical attack (by a polynomial factor). The quantum algorithm proposed in [Gro96]
(sometimes called Grover’s algorithm) allows us to improve the performance of searching
algorithms. Specifically, given a number of possible solutions to a problem, only some of
which are correct, the algorithm allows us to find a correct solution more efficiently with
a quantum computer than we can classically. This type of search is often referred to as
a “needle in a haystack” problem since typically there are many incorrect solutions and
only a few correct ones. For a description of Grover’s algorithm, see for example [Gro96]
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or [NC00].
Suppose we have a set of n elements indexed by the set of integers S = {0, 1, . . . , n−1}.
Further suppose that we are given a function f : S → {0, 1} such that:
1. f(x) = 1 if x is the index of an element which is a solution to the problem, and
2. f(x) = 0 otherwise.
The search succeeds when it finds an x such that f(x) = 1. If there is a constant number
of such x, then the best classical searching algorithm (brute force search) requires O(n)
time. However, Grover’s quantum search algorithm requires only O(
√
n) time, which is
a considerable improvement (although just a polynomial one).
In the case of the attack on the McEliece cryptosystem mentioned above, our set of
elements is the set of all k-subsets of the components of the codeword. For any particular
subset A, according to Proposition 7.10, f(A) should be 1 if and only if w(c⊕cˆ ˆ¯G−1G¯) ≤ t.
This condition provides us with an efficient way of evaluating f .
Using Grover’s algorithm, then, we can achieve a square-root speedup over the clas-
sical version of the search algorithm. While this still represents only a polynomial im-
provement in the running time, such an improvement could pose a significant security
threat for many of the McEliece parameter sizes that are currently thought of as secure.
Chapter 8
The Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem
The Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [AD97] was one of the first proposed cryptosystems whose
security was based on the hardness of problems involving lattices. This cryptosystem
is currently not of practical interest since messages are encrypted bit-by-bit, and the
ciphertext is very long compared to the plaintext; also recent attacks by Nguyen and
Stern [NS98] have shown that the scheme with small parameters is insecure. Nonetheless,
the cryptosystem has received a good deal of theoretical interest, especially since a proof
of its security in [AD97] was based on worst-case instead of average-case analysis.
Since the proposal of the Ajtai-Dwork scheme, there have been other proposals for
cryptosystems based on lattices, some of which we will discuss later. There has been much
recent interest in these “lattice-based” cryptosystems, perhaps because their security
is based on problems that are fundamentally different from integer factorisation and
computing discrete logarithms, and because the encryption and decryption rates for
several of the schemes are asymptotically faster than those for the more widely-used
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cryptosystems. For an excellent overview of the many uses of lattices in cryptography
and cryptanalysis, including simple descriptions of many of these schemes, we refer the
reader to [NS00].
8.1 The Cryptosystem
The details of the cryptosystem are quite complicated; so we present the general idea of
the scheme and refer the reader to [AD97] for a more rigorous presentation. We begin
with a few definitions.
Definition 8.1. Let w1, . . . , wn ∈ Rn. The parallelepipedW spanned by the wi is defined
as {∑ni=1 λiwi : 0 ≤ λi < 1}. In other words, W is the set of all points that are a linear
combination of the wi with coefficients between 0 and 1.
Definition 8.2. Let w1, . . . , wn ∈ Rn and let W be the parallelepiped spanned by the wi.
Let Hi be the (n−1)-dimensional hyperplane spanned by the set {wj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i}.
The width of W is defined as the maximum of the perpendicular distances between wi and
Hi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
To generate Ajtai-Dwork keys, Alice performs the following steps:
Algorithm 8.3 (Ajtai-Dwork Key Generation (sketch)).
1. Alice selects a vector u “uniformly at random” from the n-dimensional unit ball.
(Note that she actually selects u from a large discrete set of vectors in the unit ball,
as described in [AD97].)
8.1. THE CRYPTOSYSTEM 73
2. According to the procedure in [AD97] she defines a distribution Hu of points in the
n-dimensional ball of radius 2n logn such that for each point h in the distribution,
the inner product 〈h , u 〉 is very close to an integer.
3. She sets m = n3 and selects the m + n points v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . wn uniformly at
random from the distribution Hu defined above.
4. She verifies that the width of the parallelepiped spanned by w1, . . . , wn is at least
2n logn/n2. (With high probability this is true; otherwise, she begins the procedure
again.)
5. Alice’s public key is (v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . , wn) and her private key is u.
To encrypt a message for Alice, Bob does the following:
Algorithm 8.4 (Ajtai-Dwork Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key (v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . , wn). LetW be the parallelepiped
spanned by the wi.
2. He encrypts each bit z of the message as follows:
2.1 If z = 0 then
Bob chooses m values a1, . . . , am uniformly at random from {0, 1} and
computes the linear combination x =
∑m
i=1 aivi.
He reduces x “modulo W”, meaning he computes the unique vector c in
W such that x− c is an integer linear combination of the wi.
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2.2 If z = 1 then
Letting 2−nZn = {2−nv : v ∈ Zn}, Bob selects a vector c “uniformly at
random” from W ∩ 2−nZn.
3. In either case, the encrypted message is the vector c.
Each bit of the plaintext is essentially encoded as a decision problem: to decrypt the
ciphertext c, Alice (or an attacker) must decide whether c is a linear combination of the
vi (suitably reduced) or a random vector. More specifically, Alice can do the following:
Algorithm 8.5 (Ajtai-Dwork Decryption).
1. Alice computes 〈 c , u 〉 = z + δ, where z ∈ Z and −1/2 < δ ≤ 1/2.
2. If |δ| < 1/n then c is decrypted as 0; otherwise it is decrypted as 1.
In other words, if the inner product of the ciphertext and the private key is very close to
an integer, Alice decrypts the ciphertext as 0.
Theorem 8.6. Ajtai-Dwork decryption works properly (with high probability).
For a complete proof of this result, refer to [AD97].
Sketch of Proof. First, we justify that if the original message bit was 0, it is always de-
crypted correctly. Using the encryption procedure, Bob selects random ai and computes
x =
∑m
i=1 aivi. When he reduces x modulo W , he obtains the unique vector c such that
x− c = w, where w =∑nj=1 bjwj and the bj are integers.
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Note that
〈 c , u 〉 = 〈x− w , u 〉
= 〈x , u 〉 − 〈w , u 〉
=
〈
m∑
i=1
aivi , u
〉
−
〈
n∑
j=1
bjwj , u
〉
=
m∑
i=1
ai 〈 vi , u 〉 −
n∑
j=1
bi 〈wj , u 〉 .
Since Alice chose the vi from the distribution Hu specifically so that their inner
product with u was very close to an integer, we note that 〈 vi , u 〉 is “close to” an integer
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The wj are also chosen from Hu, so 〈wj , u 〉 is “close to” an integer for
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Finally, since the coefficients ai and bj are all integers, the inner product
〈 c , u 〉 is “close to” an integer.
With sufficient restrictions on the distribution Hu, the authors of [AD97] formalise
this intuitive argument and show that indeed this inner product is always within 1/n of
an integer. Hence if a 0 is sent, Alice always correctly recovers the plaintext.
We now consider the case where the original message bit was 1. In this case, Bob
randomly selects a vector c from W ∩ 2−nZn, so it is possible that the inner product
of c with u could be close to an integer. As a result, there is a small probability that
a 1 could be decrypted incorrectly as a 0. However, in Step 4 of Algorithm 8.3 the
parallelepiped W was chosen to be wide enough that this event occurs with probability
at most 1/n [AD97]. Thus, when a 1 is sent, decryption works properly with probability
at least 1− 1/n.
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8.2 Security Of The System
It is interesting to note that despite its classification as a lattice-based cryptosystem, the
Ajtai-Dwork scheme does not explicitly use lattices to encrypt or decrypt data. However,
it is usually considered to be a lattice-based cryptosystem because in [AD97] its security
was shown to be based on the worst-case hardness of a problem in lattice reduction.
Before introducing this problem, we first present some basic definitions relating to lattices.
Definition 8.7. Let B = {b1, b2, . . . , bd} be a set of d linearly independent vectors in
Rn. The lattice spanned by B is the set of all possible integer linear combinations of the
vectors in B, denoted
L(B) =
{
d∑
i=1
aibi : ai ∈ Z, 1 ≤ i ≤ d
}
.
B is called a basis for the lattice L(B). We say L(B) has dimension d.
Note that there are several possible bases for any given lattice. For example, given a
basis for a lattice L, if we take any basis vector and add to it an integer linear combination
of the other basis vectors, we obtain a different basis for the same lattice.
Definition 8.8. Let L be a lattice in Rn. The length of the shortest non-zero vector in
L (with respect to the Euclidean norm) is called the first minimum of the lattice, and
denoted λ1(L).
Definition 8.9. Let L be a d-dimensional lattice in Rn. For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the ith successive
minimum of the lattice, denoted λi(L), is the smallest real number a such that there exist
i linearly independent vectors in L whose norms are at most a. In other words,
λi(L) = min
x1,...,xi∈L
and lin.indep.
{
max
1≤j≤i
{‖xj‖}
}
.
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Definition 8.10. Let L be a lattice in Rn. The lattice gap of L is defined as the ratio
between the second and first successive minima, λ2(L)/λ1(L).
There are several problems that are thought to be hard problems in lattice theory;
we mention two of the best-known such problems.
Problem 8.11 (The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)). Given a lattice L of dimen-
sion d in Rn, find a vector v ∈ L such that ‖v‖ = λ1(L).
There is no known polynomial time algorithm to solve SVP, or to approximate it to
within a polynomial factor. The problem has been shown to be NP-hard under ran-
domised reductions; that is, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm to reduce
an instance of any problem in NP to an instance of SVP [Ajt98]. In fact, approximating
the problem to within a factor of
√
2 is NP-hard under randomised reductions [NS00].
An important contrasting complexity result has been proven as well: approximating SVP
to within a factor of
√
d/O(log d) is not NP-hard unless P = NP [GG98]. Despite all
of these results, it has not been proved or disproved that SVP is NP-hard under deter-
ministic reductions, and its NP-hardness is an important open question in lattice theory.
The best known classical algorithms to approximate SVP are based on the LLL algo-
rithm [LLL82] and its variants, which can approximate the solution to within a factor of
2(d−1)/2. In practice, the algorithm tends to outperform this theoretical bound.
Problem 8.12 (The Closest Vector Problem (CVP)). Given a lattice L of dimen-
sion d in Rn and a vector u ∈ Rn, find a vector v ∈ L such that ‖u− v‖ is minimised.
As mentioned in [NS00], this problem is known to beNP-hard; in fact, approximating
the problem to within any constant factor isNP-hard, and there is no known polynomial-
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time algorithm that can approximate CVP to within a polynomial factor of d. It is at
least as hard as SVP (since SVP is a special case of CVP where the given vector is
u = 0) and similarly approximating CVP to within a factor of
√
d/O(log d) is not NP-
hard unless P = NP [GG98]. There are algorithms that can approximate CVP in Rn
to within a factor of 2d/2 in the worst case; these algorithms are also based on the LLL
algorithm and its variants, and as mentioned previously they tend to outperform this
theoretical bound.
The hardness of the Ajtai-Dwork scheme is not based on either of these problems
exactly, but rather on a variant of SVP:
Problem 8.13 (The Unique Shortest Vector Problem (USVP)). Given a lattice
L of dimension d in Rn with lattice gap λ2(L)/λ1(L) > n
8, find a vector v ∈ L such that
‖v‖ = λ1(L).
The name for this new problem comes from the fact that the shortest vector in
a lattice with such a gap is “unique”, in that it is polynomially shorter than any other
non-parallel vector in the lattice. In [AD97] the following equivalence between USVP and
the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is established: if for random instances of the cryptosystem
there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that is capable of distinguishing an
encryption of 0 from an encryption of 1, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm to solve a worst-case instance of USVP.
Despite this promising result, Nguyen and Stern have proven that one can construct
a probabilistic decryption algorithm for the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem, given an oracle
capable of approximating CVP to within a factor of n1.33 (or equivalently an oracle
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capable of approximating SVP to within a factor of n0.5−ǫ) [NS98]. Thus as pointed out
in [NS00], since approximating CVP to within such a factor is not NP-hard [GG98] it is
likely that breaking the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is not NP-hard.
The result of Nguyen and Stern suggests that attacks on the system should be possible,
and indeed [NS98] presents a heuristic attack on the scheme based on lattice reduction
algorithms. The attack is based on the fact that for each vi, 〈 vi , u 〉 is close to some
(unknown) integer, and by finding short linear combinations of the vi, one can obtain
information about these unknown integers, which in turn reveals information about the
private key u. The implementation of the attack uses lattice reduction algorithms like
the LLL algorithm.
For n = 8, their experiments were able to recover the private key in under three hours,
and for n = 32, the authors predicted that the attack would succeed in several days, if
computations were done on several machines in parallel. Further, since for n = 32 storing
the public key requires approximately 20 Megabytes and the ciphertext for each message
bit is 768 bytes long, the scheme is impractical.
With a classical attack like this one already known, the question of the scheme’s
quantum vulnerabilities becomes a question of purely theoretical interest. There has been
little work done in applying quantum algorithms to these well-known lattice problems.
Some preliminary results were proven in [ME97], but they do not seem to provide much
advantage in this case. More recently, in [Reg02] it was shown that USVP can be reduced
to the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) in the dihedral group. However, while some work
has been done on solving HSP in the dihedral group [Ey00] there is still no known efficient
quantum algorithm to solve it completely. The quantum tools from Chapter 3 which solve
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the Abelian HSP do not seem to be of much use to a quantum attacker.
Grover’s algorithm, introduced briefly in Chapter 7, does not have a clear application
in this context, either. The best known attacks on the system all rely on the LLL
algorithm, which does not seem well-suited to being sped up with Grover’s algorithm.
If quantum algorithms can provide a quantum attacker with an advantage over a
classical one, it is likely that new algorithms will have to be developed. The problems in
lattice theory form one class of hard problems for which the known quantum algorithms
cannot significantly outperform the known classical algorithms. It is possible that lattice-
based cryptosystems (that resist classical attacks more successfully than the Ajtai-Dwork
system) may be cryptosystems that are also resistant to quantum attacks.
Chapter 9
The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi
Cryptosystem
Like the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem, the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) cryptosys-
tem [GGH97] is based on the hardness of problems in lattice reduction. We can choose
many different bases to represent the same lattice, and using a different basis can make
it much more difficult to solve particular instances of these problems. It is this fact on
which the GGH cryptosystem is based.
The GGH algorithms for encryption and decryption are more efficient than the cor-
responding algorithms in the more popular RSA and ElGamal schemes; however, the
increased efficiency of encryption and decryption is offset by the fact that GGH public
keys are considerably longer.
Recently, an attack has been discovered that successfully breaks the cryptosystem
for most practical parameter sizes [Ngu99]. Despite the resulting impracticality of the
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scheme, it is still an important cryptosystem from a theoretical point of view, since along
with the Ajtai-Dwork scheme, it was one of the first lattice-based cryptosystems.
9.1 The Cryptosystem
We begin by presenting some more definitions that are important to the study of lattice
theory.
Definition 9.1. Let B be a n×n non-singular matrix with real entries, and let L be the
n-dimensional lattice in Rn with the rows of B as a basis. The determinant of the lattice
L is defined to be the determinant of the matrix B.
Note that the determinant of the lattice is independent of the choice of basis. We
also define the orthogonality defect of a lattice basis, which is a quantity that represents
how “non-orthogonal” the basis vectors are.
Definition 9.2. Let b1, b2, . . . , bn be a basis for an n-dimensional lattice L in R
n, and
let B be the n × n non-singular matrix with the bi as its rows. The orthogonality defect
of the basis (or equivalently of the matrix B) is defined as∏n
i=1 ‖bi‖
|detB|
where ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm.
By Hadamard’s Inequality [Coh93] we know that |detB| ≤ ∏ni=1 ‖bi‖ with equality
if and only if the bi are orthogonal. Thus a matrix B has orthogonality defect 1 if and
only if its rows are orthogonal to one another, and otherwise, its orthogonality defect is
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greater than 1. In other words, the smaller the orthogonality defect, the more orthogonal
the rows of B.
In general, it is easier to solve most lattice problems (like SVP and CVP) if we have
a basis with vectors that are more orthogonal. The idea of the GGH cryptosystem is
that the public key consists of a basis with high orthogonality defect that Bob uses to
encode a message in an instance of CVP, and the private key consists of a basis with
low orthogonality defect that Alice uses to solve the instance of CVP and recover the
message.
We now present the cryptosystem; for more details, refer to [GGH97].
To generate a GGH key, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 9.3 (GGH Key Generation).
1. Using a procedure described in [GGH97], Alice generates a full-rank lattice L, and
two matrices R and B whose rows form bases for L. The generation procedure
ensures that B has high orthogonality defect, and R has low orthogonality defect.
2. She also selects a positive integer σ, as described in [GGH97], which acts as a
security parameter.
3. Her public key is (B, σ) and her private key is R.
To encrypt a message for Alice using the GGH cryptosystem, Bob does the following:
Algorithm 9.4 (GGH Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key (B, σ).
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2. Bob represents his message as a vector m ∈ Zn.
3. He generates an error vector e by setting each entry in e to either σ or −σ, each
with probability 1/2.
4. He computes the ciphertext c = mB + e.
The error vector e disguises the message m from an attacker; however, it is designed
to be small enough that m is still the closest vector in the lattice to c. Ideally, the public
basis is not “orthogonal enough” to allow an attacker to find that closest vector, but
Alice can use her private, more orthogonal basis to find it. More specifically, to decrypt
the ciphertext, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 9.5 (GGH Decryption).
1. Alice represents c as a linear combination of the vectors in R, where the coefficients
are not necessarily integers.
2. She rounds off each coefficient in the linear combination to the nearest integer and
obtains a lattice vector v.
3. She represents v as a linear combination of the columns of B.
4. With high probability, the coefficients of this linear combination are the entries in
the message vector m.
We note that it is possible for the decryption procedure to fail, since the rounding
off technique (which was proposed by Babai in [Bab86]) may not result in the correct
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lattice point. However, the authors of [GGH97] show that by selecting the parameter σ
properly, Alice can ensure that decryption works with high probability. It is also true
that when decryption fails, Alice can detect that it has failed. For more details about
these facts, see [GGH97].
Note that despite the fact that they are based on the hardness of different problems,
the GGH cryptosystem and the McEliece cryptosystem (described in Chapter 7) are quite
similar. In the GGH scheme, the public and private keys are different representations of
the same lattice, and in the McEliece scheme, the public and private keys are different
representations of the same linear code. In both cases, encrypting a message corresponds
to performing a transformation involving the public key representation and adding a
random error vector in such a way that it can easily be removed only with knowledge of
the private key representation.
9.2 Security Of The System
First consider the task of determining the plaintext given only the ciphertext. Correctly
performing this task amounts to solving an instance of CVP: the eavesdropper, given
only c = mB+ e needs to first find mB, which (assuming σ is not too large) is the vector
in the lattice closest to c. As mentioned previously, there is no known polynomial time
algorithm to solve CVP exactly, or to approximate it to within a polynomial factor.
Next note that by construction the public basis B has high orthogonality defect and
the private basis R has low orthogonality defect. Thus in order to determine the pri-
vate key given only the public key, an eavesdropper would need to solve (or at least
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approximate a solution to) a different problem that is also thought to be hard:
Problem 9.6 (The Smallest Basis Problem (SBP)). Given a basis B for a lattice
L in Rn, find the “smallest” basis B′ for L.
There are many ways that the “smallest” basis of a lattice could be defined (although
in this case we consider the basis with the smallest orthogonality defect). As with the
other lattice problems defined previously, there are no known polynomial-time algorithms
to solve SBP or to approximate it to within a polynomial factor, although there are
algorithms based on the LLL algorithm and its variants that can approximate SBP in
Rn to within a factor of 2O(n
2) in the worst case.
Originally the authors of the cryptosystem suggested three classical attacks on the
system, each of which is shown to require an infeasible amount of work in sufficiently
high dimension. We briefly mention these attacks, and refer the reader to [GGH97] for
more details. All of the attacks assume that the public basis B has been reduced to a
new basis B′ (with smaller orthogonality defect) using the LLL algorithm or one of its
variants, since this is a logical first step for any solution to the problems on which the
cryptosystem is based.
In the first attack, Eve uses the reduced basis B′ to perform the same rounding off
technique as Alice uses in the decryption procedure with the private basis R. The vector
Eve obtains will be an approximation to the correct message vector, and can be used as a
starting point for an exhaustive search for the message. According to experiments cited
in [GGH97], in dimensions up to 80 this attack works well since the LLL algorithm tends
to perform very well in practice, but in higher dimensions the attack quickly becomes
infeasible since a measure of the work required grows exponentially with the dimension.
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The second attack also involves using the reduced basis B′ to approximate CVP, but
using Babai’s “nearest plane” algorithm (a better approximation algorithm also proposed
in [Bab86]). Essentially, whereas the rounding off algorithm rounds off all of the coeffi-
cients of the resulting vector at the same time, the nearest plane algorithm rounds them
off one by one in a more adaptive way. Again according to the experiments performed by
the authors of [GGH97] the attack is much more successful than the rounding off attack
and is generally successful in dimensions up to 120, but again in higher dimensions the
work required grows exponentially.
To perform the third attack, for a particular ciphertext c = mB+e Eve creates a new
lattice L′ of dimension n+ 1 as specified by the rows of the matrix
B′ =


b1 0
...
...
bn 0
c 1


.
The vector v = e‖(1) (where the operator ‖ indicates vector concatenation) is a short
vector in L′, and in fact, as explained in [Ngu99] it is likely that it will be the shortest
vector in L′. Thus if we attempt to solve SVP in L′ using the LLL algorithm or one
of its variants, we hope that we will find the vector v, from which we can recover m.
(Note that this attack is a general approach to solving CVP by “embedding” an instance
of CVP in an instance of SVP.) Unlike in the first two attacks, if this heuristic fails to
recover the correct message, it is not clear whether the incorrect message can be used as
a starting point for an exhaustive search. Nonetheless, the attack seems to be fast and
successful in dimensions up to about 120.
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Based on their experiments, the authors of [GGH97] conjectured that the problem
of breaking the cryptosystem was intractable in dimension 300 or higher. However,
in [Ngu99] the author presents a different attack that exploits some weaknesses in the
encryption scheme and does break it in higher dimensions. Recall that c = mB+e where
e is a vector with each entry equal to ±σ. Defining s = (σ, . . . , σ) ∈ Zn we see that
e + s ≡ 0 (mod 2σ) and hence c + s ≡ mB (mod 2σ). It is further shown in [Ngu99]
that this modular equation has very few solutions with high probability, and it is not
hard to compute all of them. So we can easily determine m mod 2σ. With this partial
information, we can simplify the CVP instance defined by a ciphertext and obtain a
new CVP instance where the error vector is much shorter than e. Then by applying the
embedding technique (or some other algorithm for CVP) we are more likely to be able
to recover the original message. As predicted, experiments cited in [Ngu99] indicate that
this attack can break the scheme in dimensions up to about 400. In dimensions higher
than 400, the parameters become so large as to make the scheme practically infeasible.
As with the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem presented in Chapter 8, quantum attacks on
the GGH cryptosystem are only theoretically interesting, since there are effective classical
attacks against the scheme. Again, however, there seem to be very few known quantum
algorithms that could assist an attacker further. The Abelian Hidden Subgroup Problem
(HSP) framework does not seem useful, nor does Grover’s searching algorithm. The
reduction in [Reg02] is interesting in this context, although it is not currently useful
to a quantum attacker since we know of no efficient algorithm to solve HSP in the
dihedral group. Again, the current evidence suggests that lattice-based cryptosystems
could perhaps be systems that resist quantum attacks as well as they do classical ones.
Chapter 10
The NTRU Cryptosystem
The NTRU cryptosystem [HPS98] is a relatively new cryptosystem that uses polynomial
arithmetic for encryption and decryption. One of the most efficient known classical
attacks on the cryptosystem is based on a problem in lattice reduction. Because of this
attack, the scheme is often referred to as a “lattice-based” cryptosystem, even though
the description of the system does not rely on lattices.
The cryptosystem has the interesting property that there exist valid ciphertexts that
cannot be decrypted properly using the private key. For this reason, many of the se-
curity properties that can be proven for traditional public key encryption schemes do
not hold for the NTRU cryptosystem. In [Pro03] a new class of encryption schemes is
defined called imperfect public key encryption schemes, which allow for the possibility of
such “indecipherable” ciphertexts. The paper also presents a new attack on the scheme
that attempts to recover the private key by searching for indecipherable ciphertexts. In
experiments, this attack has been successful against the system parameter sets originally
89
90 CHAPTER 10. THE NTRU CRYPTOSYSTEM
suggested in [HPS98].
10.1 The Cryptosystem
We work in the ring Z[x]/(xN − 1) for some integer N . We first define a notation for
classes of polynomials in this ring:
Definition 10.1. The set L(d1, d2) is the set of polynomials in Z[x]/(xN − 1) with d1
coefficients equal to 1, d2 coefficients equal to −1, and the remaining coefficients equal
to 0.
To generate an NTRU key, Alice performs the following steps:
Algorithm 10.2 (NTRU Key Generation).
1. Alice selects two coprime integers p and q with q considerably larger than p, and
an integer N . She also selects integers df , dg, and dr considerably smaller than N .
(These parameters may be chosen to provide the desired level of security for the
cryptosystem as described in [HPS98].)
2. She randomly selects two polynomials F ∈ L(df , df − 1) and G ∈ L(dg, dg).
3. She computes the polynomials F−1p and F
−1
q , the inverses of F modulo p and modulo
q, respectively. That is, FF−1p = 1 (when the coefficients are taken modulo p) and
FF−1q = 1 (when the coefficients are taken modulo q). (Such inverses will exist
with high probability; if they do not, she begins the procedure again.)
4. Alice calculates H = F−1q G mod q.
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5. Alice’s public key is (p, q, N, dr, H), and her private key is F .
To encrypt a message for Alice using the NTRU cryptosystem, Bob performs the
following steps:
Algorithm 10.3 (NTRU Encryption).
1. Bob obtains Alice’s public key.
2. He converts the message to a polynomial M ∈ Z[x]/(xN − 1) with coefficients in
the range
[−p−1
2
, p−1
2
]
.
3. He selects a random polynomial R ∈ L(dr, dr).
4. Bob computes the encrypted message C = (pRH +M) mod q.
To decrypt the ciphertext and recover the original message, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 10.4 (NTRU Decryption).
1. She computes the polynomial A = FC mod q, choosing the coefficients of A to be
integers in the interval
[− q
2
, q
2
]
.
2. She computes M ′ = F−1p A mod p.
3. With high probability, M ′ is the original message.
Theorem 10.5. NTRU decryption works properly (with high probability).
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Justification. As mentioned above, there exist certain ciphertexts that cannot be prop-
erly decrypted using the private key. Although not proven rigorously, there is heuristic
evidence that such indecipherable ciphertexts occur rarely, as demonstrated in [Sil01]
and [Sil02].
Note that
A = FC mod q
= (FpRH + FM) mod q
= (FpRF−1q G + FM) mod q
= (pRG+ FM) mod q.
Suppose the coefficients of the polynomial A = (pRG+FM) mod q computed by Al-
ice happen to be exactly the same as those of the unreduced polynomial B = pRG+FM .
In that case, the decryption algorithm will work properly, since reducing A modulo p pro-
duces the polynomial FM , and multiplying by F−1p correctly recoversM . In other words,
we wish to show that we can choose parameters for the system so that the polynomial
A computed by Alice is exactly equal to the polynomial B in Z[x]/(xN − 1). Since Alice
computes A choosing its coefficients to lie in the interval
[− q
2
, q
2
]
, it is sufficient to ensure
that with high probability the coefficients of B lie in the same interval.
In [Sil01] the ways in which this sufficient condition may not be met are classified
into two categories:
1. “Wrapping failure” is said to occur if the maximum coefficient of B is greater than
or equal to q/2, or if the minimum coefficient of B is less than or equal to −q/2. In
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this case, when Alice chooses the coefficients of A to be in the interval
[− q
2
, q
2
]
, she
will not obtain B, and hence she will obtain the incorrect decrypted message. (To
allow her to detect such a failure, the authors of [HPS98] suggest including some
kind of redundancy in the message so that its proper decryption can be verified.)
2. “Gap failure” is said to occur if the difference between the maximum and minimum
coefficients of B (called the “spread” of B [Sil01]) is greater than q. In this case,
when Alice chooses the coefficients of A to be in any interval of width q, she will
not obtain B, and hence she will obtain the incorrect decrypted message.
For a particular parameter set, the probability of wrapping or gap failure can be
estimated by performing many encryptions of random messages and calculating the pro-
portion of them that exhibit each type of failure when decryption is attempted. This
is the strategy employed in [Sil01] and for the parameter sets suggested in that paper
the estimates for the failure probabilities are indeed low (on the order of 10−5 to 10−6
for wrapping failure and 10−9 to 10−13 for gap failure). It should be noted that these
are empirical estimates, and that the gap failure probabilities in [Sil01] were calculated
using an approximation formula (whose correctness is justified further in [Sil02]) since
the chance of actually observing an instance of gap failure is so small.
This evidence indicates that indeed NTRU decryption tends to work properly in
practice.
It should be noted, however, that while the probability of obtaining one of these
indecipherable ciphertexts may indeed be small, an attacker can use one of them to
obtain information about the corresponding private key [Pro03].
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10.2 Security Of The System
NTRU is usually considered to be a lattice-based cryptosystem; despite the fact that
lattices are not used in the encryption or decryption algorithms, one of the most efficient
known classical attacks on the cryptosystem is based on finding short vectors in a lattice.
We present the attack briefly below, as it is presented in [HPS98].
Recall that Alice’s public key is (p, q, N, dr, H). Let the coefficients of H be given by
h0, h1, . . . , hN−1 so that H =
∑N−1
i=0 hix
i. We define the following 2N×2N matrix, where
α is a parameter chosen by the attacker:
B =


α 0 · · · 0 h0 h1 · · · hN−1
0 α · · · 0 hN−1 h0 · · · hN−2
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · α h1 h2 · · · h0
0 0 · · · 0 q 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 q · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · q


.
Let the rows of B be b0, b1, . . . b2N−1. Recall that H = F−1q G mod q, so G = HF mod q.
In other words, there exists some polynomial K ∈ Z[x]/(xN−1) such that G = HF+qK.
Let the coefficients of F be f0, f1, . . . , fN−1 and the coefficients of K be k0, k1, . . . , kN−1;
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these coefficients are all integers. Then note that
f0b0 + f1b1 + · · ·+ fN−1bN−1 + k0bN + k1bN+1 + · · ·+ kN−1b2N−1
= (αF )||(HF + qK)
= (αF )||G
where the operator || indicates vector concatenation. In other words, if we let L be the
lattice spanned by the rows of B, we see that the vector τ = (αF )||G is in L. The goal
of the attacker will be to choose α so that τ is a short vector in the lattice L and to
attempt to find it using lattice reduction techniques like the LLL algorithm [LLL82] and
its variants.
In [HPS98] the authors next make use of the Gaussian heuristic, which does not
seem to be well-known, but which bounds the expected length of the shortest vector
in a “random” lattice of dimension d. The heuristic says that a sphere that contains a
lattice point at its centre and exactly one other lattice point is expected to have a volume
equal to the determinant D of the lattice; the radius of such a sphere clearly provides
an upper bound on the shortest vector in the lattice [Why03]. Specifically, the heuristic
says that the expected length of the shortest vector in a random lattice of dimension d
and determinant D is between D1/d
√
d
2πe
and D1/d
√
d
πe
.
In our case, the determinant of L is equal to detB = αNqN ; we also have d = 2N .
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Thus the expected length of the shortest vector in L should be close to
s = (αNqN)1/2N
√
2N
2pie
= (αq)1/2
√
N
pie
=
√
Nαq
pie
.
In order for the lattice reduction algorithms to have the greatest chance of finding the
vector τ , the attacker would like to maximise the probability that it is one of the shortest
vectors in the lattice. This will be likely if τ is considerably shorter than this expected
length of the shortest vector. In other words, the attacker should choose α to maximise
the ratio s/ ‖τ‖. Note that ‖τ‖ =
√
α2 ‖F‖2 + ‖G‖2, where the norm of a polynomial is
taken to mean the norm of the vector of its coefficients. Thus,
s
‖τ‖ =
√
Nαq
pie(α2 ‖F‖2 + ‖G‖2) . (10.1)
Since N , q, pi, and e are all fixed, the attacker should attempt to maximise
α
α2 ‖F‖2 + ‖G‖2 = (α ‖F‖
2 + α−1 ‖G‖2)−1.
Differentiating the expression with respect to α and setting it equal to zero, we see that
it is maximised when α = ‖G‖ / ‖F‖. We assume that the attacker has knowledge of
‖F‖ and ‖G‖ (or equivalently of df and dg) which is not an unrealistic assumption since
the values of df and dg are specified in the sets of suggested system parameters listed
in [HPS98]. The attacker can therefore compute this optimal value for α, and proceed to
use the LLL algorithm to find short vectors in L (as described for example in [Coh93]).
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In [HPS98] this optimal value for α is substituted back into Equation (10.1) to obtain
the constant
c =
√
Nq
2pie ‖F‖ ‖G‖ .
It is noted that this c can be used as a measure of the “randomness” of the lattice defined
by B. If c is close to 1, the vector τ is not considerably larger than the expected length
of the shortest vector in a random lattice, and so in that sense, L is fairly “random” and
typical reduction algorithms should work less effectively than when c is larger.
Based on limited evidence, it would appear as though the time required for this attack
is still exponential in N , with a constant in the exponent proportional to 1/c [HPS98].
In [May99] a modification of this attack was proposed that requires a lattice of smaller
dimension, and as a result the attack runs more quickly. The new attack is especially
successful against certain classes of keys, even when using parameters of a size that were
originally thought to provide high security. These classes of keys should therefore be
avoided.
The imperfection of the decryption algorithm has recently been shown to be a serious
weakness of the scheme. The attack proposed in [Pro03] is effective against the parameter
sets proposed in [HPS98] provided that the attacker has access to an oracle that given
a ciphertext returns only whether the ciphertext could be properly decrypted using the
corresponding private key. It is therefore desirable to choose parameter sets that minimise
the probability of obtaining such an indecipherable ciphertext, or in other words, to
minimise the probability of wrapping failure and gap failure.
Another strategy to avoid such an attack is to perform further processing on inde-
cipherable ciphertexts in an attempt to recover the correct plaintext. Examples of this
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further processing are suggested in [Sil01]. If wrapping failure occurs, Alice may re-
calculate the polynomial A with coefficients in the interval
[− q
2
+ x, q
2
+ x
]
for various
(positive and negative) values of x and try again. Provided gap failure has not occurred,
this correction mechanism will likely succeed for some small value of x, and Alice will
be able to recover the correct plaintext. Correction for gap failure is more difficult than
for wrapping failure, since in order to obtain B Alice would have to move some of the
coefficients of A outside the interval
[− q
2
, q
2
]
and try again. Since the set of coefficients
that need to be moved is unknown, this correction method is much less feasible.
However, in both of these cases, as noted in [Pro03], the attacker may still be able
to use timing and power analysis to determine when further processing is required, and
hence when a ciphertext was not decipherable using the standard decryption algorithm.
In that case, the attack could still be ultimately successful.
It is unclear whether the system is more vulnerable in a quantum setting; the algo-
rithms from Chapter 3 do not seem to provide the quantum attacker with any useful
tools. As discussed with respect to some of the previous schemes, it may be possible to
use Grover’s algorithm to speed up the known classical attacks (or parts of them). In
the case of the first attack, such an improvement is not immediately obvious since the
majority of the running time is spent in the LLL algorithm (which as we have mentioned
previously is not easily improved upon with quantum resources). In the case of the sec-
ond attack, such an improvement might be more feasible since the initial search for an
indecipherable ciphertext could possibly be sped up by a square root factor. Other steps
of the second attack, such as modifying the first indecipherable ciphertext to find another
one which is “nearly decipherable”, might also run faster using Grover’s algorithm.
Chapter 11
A Quantum Public Key
Cryptosystem
All of the cryptosystems presented so far have been classical cryptosystems, in that
they use only classical operations in all of the key generation, encryption, and decryption
algorithms. If we wish to find cryptosystems that resist attacks with a quantum computer,
however, it seems natural to also allow the use of quantum operations in any of the
three algorithms. The cryptosystem presented in [OTU00] and summarised below uses
some quantum operations to generate keys, and then uses purely classical algorithms to
encrypt and decrypt messages. We will refer to this scheme as the Quantum Public Key
cryptosystem (QPKC).
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11.1 The Cryptosystem
Before presenting the cryptosystem, we first present some definitions and results from
algebraic number theory that are important to understanding the cryptosystem. First
we introduce a few concepts related to algebraic numbers and algebraic integers.
Definition 11.1. Let α ∈ C. Then we say α is an algebraic number if there exists a
non-zero p ∈ Z[x] such that p(α) = 0. Further, if p can be chosen to be monic (that is,
with a leading coefficient of 1) then we say α is an algebraic integer.
Definition 11.2. Let α be an algebraic number. Let m ∈ Z[x] be chosen such that
m(α) = 0, the leading coefficient of m is positive, and the coefficients of m are coprime.
If we further choose m to be of minimal degree, then m is unique and irreducible and
called the minimal polynomial of α.
Definition 11.3. Let R ⊆ C. The set of integers of R, denoted OR, is the intersection
of R with the set of all algebraic integers. If R is a ring, then OR is also a ring.
We also introduce the concept of a number field, and the embedding of a number field
in C.
Definition 11.4. A number field K is a subfield of C which is finite-dimensional when
considered as a vector space over Q. The degree of K is the dimension of this vector
space.
Proposition 11.5. Let K be a number field of degree n. There exists θ ∈ K such
that K = Q[θ], and the minimal polynomial of θ has degree n. There exist exactly n
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embeddings of K in C, which are maps in which θ 7→ θi for i = 1, . . . , n, where the θi are
the distinct roots in C of the minimal polynomial of θ.
Definition 11.6. Let K be a number field of degree n. Let σ1, . . . , σn denote the embed-
dings of K in C. For any α ∈ K, the norm of α is given by
N (α) =
n∏
i=1
σi(α).
We now define ideals, prime ideals, cosets, and quotient rings.
Definition 11.7. Let R be a ring. An ideal of R is a subset I ⊆ R with the following
properties:
1. I is a subgroup of (R,+), and
2. if a ∈ I and r ∈ R then ra ∈ I.
Definition 11.8. An ideal I of a ring R is called a prime ideal if I 6= R and ab ∈ I
implies a ∈ I or b ∈ I.
Definition 11.9. Let I be an ideal of a ring R. The set a+I = {a+ x : a ∈ R, x ∈ I} is
called the coset of I corresponding to a. Addition and multiplication of cosets are defined
as follows:
• (a1 + I) + (a2 + I) = (a1 + a2) + I
• (a1 + I) · (a2 + I) = (a1 · a2) + I
Proposition 11.10. Let I be an ideal of a ring R. The set of cosets of I is a ring under
the operations of addition and multiplication defined above. This new ring is called a
quotient ring and is denoted R/I.
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Finally we mention three more well-known results that we will use later. The second of
these results is a rewording of Proposition 1 from [OTU00]. The third is a generalisation
of Fermat’s Little Theorem.
Proposition 11.11. Let K be a number field and let p be a non-zero prime ideal of OK .
Then OK/p is a finite field. The cardinality of OK/p is called the norm of p and denoted
N (p).
Proposition 11.12. Let K be a number field of degree n and let p be a prime ideal
of OK . Then there exist elements ω1, . . . , ωn ∈ OK and e1, . . . , en ∈ Z such that the
elements of OK/p are uniquely represented by the elements of
R =
{
n∑
i=1
aiωi : 0 ≤ ai < ei, i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Proposition 11.13. Let p be a prime ideal of OK , and let g be a non-zero element from
OK/p. Then gN(p)−1 ≡ 1 (mod p).
We now present the cryptosystem. The steps basically correspond to the steps
in [OTU00], although some minor variations have been made for clarity.
To generate a key in this quantum public key cryptosystem, Alice performs the fol-
lowing steps:
Algorithm 11.14 (QPKC Key Generation).
1. Alice selects a set K of number fields, and integers n and k. (These parameters
may be chosen to provide the desired level of security for the cryptosystem.)
2. She randomly selects an algebraic number field K from K.
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3. She selects a prime ideal p of OK , and a generator g of the multiplicative group of
the finite field OK/p.
4. She chooses n elements p1, . . . , pn fromOK/p such that the following two conditions
are satisfied:
4.1 N (p1), . . . ,N (pn) are coprime, and
4.2 For any subset {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the product
∏k
j=1 pij is in the set R
defined in Proposition 11.12.
5. Alice uses the quantum algorithm for finding discrete logarithms described in Sec-
tion 3.8 to find q1, . . . , qn such that pi ≡ gqi (mod p), where qi ∈ ZN (p)−1 for
i = 1, . . . , n.
6. She randomly selects a rational integer d in ZN (p)−1, and computes the values
bi = (qi + d) mod (N (p)− 1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
7. Alice’s public key is (K, n, k, b1, . . . , bn) and her private key is (K, p, g, d, p1, . . . , pn).
Note that the condition in Step 4.2 seems complicated to check, but based on the
set of number fields selected, it may be possible to simplify it. For example, in [OTU00]
the authors present a version of this scheme that sets K to be the set of all imaginary
quadratic number fields. In this particular case, by using some further results from
number theory, it can be shown that checking the condition amounts to verifying that
some bounds are met on the size of the norms of the pi. Similar simplifications may be
possible for other choices of K, and one general method is presented in [OTU00] (although
this method results in an encryption scheme with a low information rate).
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To encrypt a message for Alice, Bob performs the following steps:
Algorithm 11.15 (QPKC Encryption).
1. He starts with a message m of length ⌊log (n
k
)⌋ bits.
2. He uses the following procedure to encode m into a binary string s = s1s2 · · · sn of
length n bits and of Hamming weight k:
2.1 He sets l ← k.
2.2 For i from 1 to n:
If m ≥ (n−i
l
)
then Bob sets si ← 1, m← m−
(
n−i
l
)
, and l ← l − 1.
Otherwise, he sets si ← 0.
3. Bob computes the encrypted message c =
∑n
i=1 sibi.
To decrypt the ciphertext and recover the original message, Alice does the following:
Algorithm 11.16 (QPKC Decryption).
1. She computes r = (c− kd) mod (N(p)− 1).
2. She computes u ∈ OK such that u = gr mod p.
3. She finds an element v such that u and v are in the same coset of p, and v is in the
set R defined in Proposition 11.12.
4. Alice recovers s from v as follows:
4.1 For i from 1 to n:
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If pi|v then she sets si ← 1.
Otherwise she sets si ← 0.
5. Alice recovers m from s as follows:
5.1 She sets m← 0, and l ← k.
5.2 For i from 1 to n:
If si = 1, then set m← m+
(
n−i
l
)
and l ← l − 1.
Theorem 11.17. The decryption procedure works properly.
Proof. First consider the value u computed by Alice in the decryption procedure. Note
that
u = gr mod p
= gc−kd mod p
= g(
∑n
i=1 sibi)−kd mod p
= g(
∑n
i=1 si(qi+d))−kd mod p
= g(
∑n
i=1 siqi)+kd−kd mod p
=
n∏
i=1
(gqi)si mod p
=
n∏
i=1
psii mod p.
Next consider the element v ∈ R such that v ≡ u (mod p). We claim that in fact
v =
∏n
i=1 p
si
i . Suppose that the claim is not true. By the condition in Step 4.2, since
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exactly k of the si are 1 and the rest are 0,
∏n
i=1 p
si
i is an element of R. Since the elements
of R are in distinct cosets of p it must be true that v 6≡∏ni=1 psii (mod p). Finally, since
v ≡ u (mod p) we must have u 6≡ ∏ni=1 psii (mod p) which is a contradiction. Thus
v =
∏n
i=1 p
si
i .
As pointed out in [OTU00], it is not always true that OK is a unique factorisation
domain. However, note that
N (v) = N
(
n∏
i=1
psii
)
=
n∏
i=1
N (pi)si
by the definition of the norm. By the condition in Step 4.1, N (p1), . . . ,N (pn) were all
chosen to be coprime. As a result there is a unique decomposition of N (v) into a product
of the N (pi), and hence a unique decomposition of v into a product of the pi.
The remainder of the decryption algorithm finds this unique decomposition of v into
a product of the pi, recovering the correct values for the si, and then correctly decodes
the si back to the message m.
11.2 Security Of The Scheme
Consider the task faced by an passive attacker Eve who wishes to determine the private
key from the public key. It is hard for Eve to determine the correct number field K from
the set K, since K could be exponentially large. If the field K were revealed in some
way, there could be exponentially many generators g for the field. Since only a small
number of elements from OK/p are chosen as the pi, it is unlikely that an attacker could
correctly determine even a small subset of the pi, and in order for some known attacks on
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similar schemes to succeed, a large subset is required. Further, even if a large subset were
determined, the attacker would still have to find the one-to-one correspondence between
the known pi and the bi. This task should be difficult without knowledge of both g and
d since the relationship between an element and its discrete logarithm tends to appear
random. These observations from [OTU00] are all heuristic, but they do seem to indicate
that it should be difficult for an attacker to determine the private key from the public
key.
To determine the plaintext of a message from a ciphertext, the attacker must solve
an instance of the following problem:
Problem 11.18 (Subset-Sum Problem (SSP)). Given the positive integers c and
b1, . . . , bn, find m1, . . .mn ∈ {0, 1} such that c =
∑n
i=1mibi.
SSP is known to be NP-complete, and thus it is unlikely that there is a polynomial-
time algorithm that solves general instances of the problem. However, there are algo-
rithms that have been successful in solving instances that satisfy certain conditions. The
density of an instance of SSP is defined as
n
log
(
max
1≤i≤n
{bi}
) .
There are algorithms based on the LLL algorithm that are generally successful at solving
SSP instances with a density less than 0.9408 [CLOS91]. This and similar attacks have
been used to successfully cryptanalyse other schemes based on the hardness of SSP,
and so to avoid these attacks, we wish to ensure that we can choose parameters for
this quantum cryptosystem that result in a sufficiently high density. Indeed, as shown
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in [OTU00], the implementation of the scheme with K chosen to be the set of imaginary
quadratic number fields results in a density that is at least 1, and this provides some
evidence that the scheme could resist such an attack.
Chapter 12
Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment
So far we have described a number of public key encryption schemes, which allow Bob
to send a secret message to Alice even if they have never met before to agree on a secret
key. In the following chapters, we will discuss key establishment protocols, in which Alice
and Bob (who still may never have met before) send a series of messages over a public
channel, they each perform some mathematical operations, and they each obtain a copy
of a secret key. If Eve is listening on the public channel and intercepts all of the messages
sent between Alice and Bob, she should not be able to determine this secret key. Once
a secret key has been established, Alice and Bob can use it to encrypt messages for one
another using a symmetric key encryption scheme, for example. The first proposed key
establishment protocol was the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
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12.1 The Protocol
The Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol works as follows:
Algorithm 12.1 (Diffie-Hellman Protocol).
1. Alice and Bob agree on a group G of prime order p and a generator g of G. (These
choices can be made public.)
2. Alice selects an integer a uniformly at random from {0, . . . , p− 1}. She computes
the value ga and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob selects an integer b uniformly at random from {0, . . . , p−1}. He computes the
value gb and sends it to Alice.
4. Bob uses b and the value he receives from Alice to compute (ga)b = gab.
5. Alice uses a and the value she receives from Bob to compute (gb)a = gab.
At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob share the secret value gab, which they can
use to derive a secret key.
12.2 Security Of The Protocol
The only values that are sent on the public channel are ga and gb. This means that in
order to determine the secret key, Eve must solve the following problem:
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Problem 12.2 (Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP)). Let G be a group of prime order
p, and let g be a generator of G. Given g, ga, and gb where a and b are selected uniformly
at random from {0, . . . , p− 1}, find gab.
Note that if Eve can solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) she can solve DHP:
she can simply compute a from ga, and then compute (gb)a = gab. In other words, DHP
is polynomial-time reducible to DLP. There are some groups in which it is also true that
DLP is reducible to DHP, but this is not known to be true in general: the equivalence of
DLP and DHP in general remains an open problem. It is clear, however, that the group
G must be chosen carefully so that DLP is computationally infeasible in G, such as the
multiplicative group Z∗p where p is prime, or the group of points on an elliptic curve over
a finite field. For more examples of such groups, see [MvOV96].
The most common attack on the Diffie-Hellman protocol is not to solve DHP directly
but rather to solve DLP. Thus the algorithms discussed in Chapter 6 are the best classical
algorithms currently known to break the scheme. Recall that these algorithms all require
superpolynomial time and so the Diffie-Hellman protocol is widely thought to be secure
against a passive adversary with a classical computer. However, because of the existence
of a polynomial time quantum algorithm for DLP as discussed in Section 3.8, the protocol
is not secure against an adversary with a quantum computer.
Chapter 13
Buchmann-Williams Key
Establishment
The Buchmann-Williams key establishment protocols are protocols whose security is
based on the hardness of problems in algebraic number theory. There are two versions of
the protocol, one which takes place in an imaginary quadratic number field [BW88] and
another which takes place in a real quadratic number field [BW90]. The imaginary version
of the protocol is the Diffie-Hellman protocol set in a particular finite Abelian group,
whereas the real version of the protocol is a variation on the Diffie-Hellman protocol set
in a finite set that is “group-like”.
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13.1 The Protocol
Before presenting the protocol, we mention some important definitions and results. For
more details, see for example [Coh93] or [Jac99].
Definition 13.1. Let ∆ be a non-square integer congruent to 0 or 1 mod 4. The quadratic
field of discriminant ∆ is
Q[
√
∆ ] = Q +
√
∆Q.
The quadratic order of discriminant ∆ is given by
O∆ = Z + ∆+
√
∆
2
Z.
If ∆ < 0 we call O∆ an imaginary quadratic order, and if ∆ > 0 we call O∆ a real
quadratic order. In either case, O∆ is a subring of Q[
√
∆].
Definition 13.2. A fractional ideal of O∆ is a subset of Q[
√
∆ ] of the form
a = q
(
aZ +
b+
√
∆
2
Z
)
where q ∈ Q, a, b ∈ Z, a, q > 0 and b2 ≡ ∆ (mod 4a). We denote a by the triple (q, a, b).
If q = 1 the ideal is called a primitive ideal.
Like the ideals introduced in Definition 11.7, a fractional ideal of O∆ is invariant
under multiplication by elements of O∆. However, unlike those ideals, a fractional ideal
of O∆ is not necessarily a subset of O∆.
We can define a multiplication operation on ideals as follows:
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Definition 13.3. Let a and b be ideals of O∆. The product of a and b is
ab =


∑
(a,b)∈U
ab : U ⊂ a× b, |U | <∞

 .
The product ab is also an ideal of O∆; that is, the set of ideals is closed under
multiplication. The order O∆ itself acts as a multiplicative identity since aO∆ = O∆a =
a.
Definition 13.4. An ideal a is said to be invertible if there exists an ideal a−1 such that
aa−1 = O∆.
Definition 13.5. An ideal a is said to be principal if there exists an element α ∈ Q[√∆ ]
such that a = αO∆.
The set of invertible ideals forms a group under multiplication; this group is denoted
I∆. Every principal ideal is invertible, since (αO∆)−1 = α−1O∆, and in fact the set of
principal ideals forms a subgroup of I∆; this subgroup is denoted P∆. We now come to
a very important definition:
Definition 13.6. The class group of O∆ is the factor group I∆/P∆, and is denoted by
Cl∆. The class number of O∆ is the order of Cl∆, and is denoted by h∆.
Thus the class group Cl∆ is a set of equivalence classes, where two invertible ideals a
and b are in the same equivalence class if and only if there is some principal ideal αO∆
such that αO∆a = b. It turns out that these equivalence classes form a finite Abelian
group under the multiplication operation defined above.
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The above definitions are the same for both imaginary and real quadratic orders,
but many of the properties of these two types of quadratic orders are quite different.
We will first describe some further properties of imaginary quadratic orders and their
class groups and present the imaginary Buchmann-Williams key establishment protocol
from [BW88]. We will then describe some further properties of real quadratic orders and
their class groups and present the real Buchmann-Williams key establishment protocol.
The real version of the protocol was first published in [BW90], although the presentation
in [SBW94] is considerably more detailed and complete.
13.1.1 The Imaginary Case
In this section we assume that ∆ < 0 so that O∆ is an imaginary quadratic order.
Definition 13.7. Let a be a primitive ideal of O∆ with the representation
a = aZ +
b+
√
∆
2
Z
where a, b ∈ Z, a > 0 and b2 ≡ ∆ (mod 4a). Let c = b2−∆
4a
. Then a is called a reduced
ideal if 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ c, or if 0 < −b < a < c.
When dealing with the equivalence classes that are the elements of a factor group,
ideally we would like to have a canonical representative of each equivalence class so that
we can use those representatives for computation. (For example, in the factor group
Zp = Z/pZ we use the representatives 0, 1, . . . , p− 1 for the equivalence classes.) In the
case of imaginary quadratic orders, each equivalence class in Cl∆ contains exactly one
reduced ideal. Thus we can choose the set of reduced ideals to be the set of canonical
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representatives for the elements of Cl∆. There are algorithms that, given any ideal in
I∆, can efficiently compute the equivalent reduced ideal; we can use these algorithms and
modifications of them to compute reduced products, powers, and inverses of all invertible
ideals [Jac99].
It is also important to note that the class number h∆ is typically close to
√
∆, so there
are approximately
√
∆ equivalence classes in Cl∆. Further, a well-supported conjecture
by Cohen and Lenstra predicts that Cl∆ is typically cyclic or “nearly cyclic” (for example,
the direct product of a large cyclic group and a much smaller one) [Coh93].
We can now describe the imaginary case of the Buchmann-Williams key establishment
protocol. The idea is that, Alice and Bob agree on some element g ∈ Cl∆ and perform
the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol in the subgroup generated by g,
〈g〉 = {O∆, g, g2, . . . , gr−1}
where r is the order of g.
The protocol works as follows:
Algorithm 13.8 (Buchmann-Williams Protocol (Imaginary Case)).
1. Alice and Bob agree on a discriminant ∆ < 0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4) and a reduced
ideal g of O∆. (These choices can be made public.)
2. Alice chooses an integer a uniformly at random from {1, . . . , ⌊√∆ ⌋}. She computes
the value ga and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob chooses an integer b uniformly at random from {1, . . . , ⌊√∆ ⌋}. He computes
the value gb and sends it to Alice.
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4. Bob uses b and the value he receives from Alice to compute (ga)b = gab.
5. Alice uses a and the value she receives from Bob to compute (gb)a = gab.
At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob share the secret ideal gab, which they can
use to derive a secret key.
13.1.2 The Real Case
In this section we assume that ∆ > 0 so that O∆ is a real quadratic order. Let n = log∆.
We can still define a reduced ideal, but the definition changes slightly:
Definition 13.9. Let a be a primitive ideal of O∆ with the representation
a = aZ +
b+
√
∆
2
Z
where a, b ∈ Z, a > 0 and b2 ≡ ∆ (mod 4a). Then a is a reduced ideal if
∣∣∣√∆− 2a∣∣∣ < b < √∆.
We also define the units and the regulator of a real quadratic order:
Definition 13.10. An element ε ∈ O∆ is called a unit if there exists an element ε′ ∈ O∆
such that εε′ = 1. The fundamental unit of O∆ is the smallest positive unit greater than
1 in O∆, and denoted ε∆.
Definition 13.11. The regulator of the real quadratic order O∆ is log ε∆, and denoted
R∆.
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Unlike the imaginary case, it is not true in the real case that each equivalence class
of Cl∆ contains exactly one reduced ideal; we can say only that each equivalence class
contains a finite number of reduced ideals. The class number is typically very small, often
h∆ = 1, 2, etc., meaning that there are very few equivalence classes in Cl∆ and each one
contains many reduced ideals. In fact, h∆R∆ ≈
√
∆ and in this way, the regulator of the
order is in some way a measure for how many reduced ideals occur in each equivalence
class.
Because h∆ is generally very small in a real quadratic order, Cl∆ is a poor choice for
a group for the typical Diffie-Hellman key establishment. However, in [Sha72] Shanks
proposed a method that could be used to organise the set of reduced ideals in any
equivalence class into a structure that is not a group structure, but “group-like” in some
respects, which he called the “infrastructure” of the class.
Shanks proposed a real-valued “distance” function that defines the distance between
any two reduced ideals in the same equivalence class. This function implies an ordering
of the reduced ideals: they can be arranged in order of increasing distance from the unit
ideal O∆.
Definition 13.12. The distance between two reduced ideals a and b is denoted δ(a, b).
We will use δ(a) as a shorthand for δ(a,O∆).
Shanks also defined a function ρ that given any reduced ideal would determine the
next reduced ideal in the ordering. By repeatedly applying the ρ operator to O∆, we
eventually obtain all of the reduced ideals in the equivalence class, and then again obtain
O∆. In other words, the ordering is a cyclical ordering of the reduced ideals. The total
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distance around the cycle of reduced ideals (using Shanks’s distance function) is R∆ (the
regulator of O∆).
We can perform several operations with the reduced ideals in this infrastructure, as
described for example in [Jac99]. One of the most important operations is the following:
given a reduced ideal a and a real number x, we can compute the last reduced ideal
whose distance from a is no more than x (modulo R∆). If we think of the reduced ideals
as being arranged on a circle of circumference R∆, this operation corresponds to starting
at the point on the circle corresponding to a, proceeding around the circumference a
distance of x, and selecting the last reduced ideal we encounter. As a result, this ideal is
sometimes called the ideal to the left of x (relative to a).
Definition 13.13. We will denote the ideal to the left of x (relative to a) by λ(x, a). We
will use λ(x) as a shorthand for λ(x,O∆).
We can also define the error of the ideal to the left of x (relative to a) which quantifies
how well the true distance between λ(x, a) and a approximates x:
Definition 13.14. The error of λ(x, a) is denoted ε(x, a) and is defined by
ε(x, a) =
(
x− δ(λ(x) , a)
)
mod R∆.
We will use ε(x) as shorthand for ε(x,O∆).
The concepts of the ideal to the left of x and the error of this ideal are illustrated in
Figure 13.1. In the figure, we are working relative to O∆.
It should be noted that the distances with which the participants in the protocol must
work are all real numbers, and so to perform the required calculations exactly would
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Figure 13.1: The Cycle Of Reduced Principal Ideals
require infinite precision. The participants must therefore choose some finite precision
within which to perform all of the calculations, and as a result there may be round-off
errors that propagate through the protocol. These potential round-off errors force the
participants to perform an extra “clean-up” round of communication after the one usual
round of a Diffie-Hellman-like exchange in order to make sure that they share the same
value.
We can now sketch the protocol. There are many details of the implementation that
are omitted in the presentation below; for a more complete description of the protocol,
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refer to [SBW94].
Algorithm 13.15 (Buchmann-Williams Protocol (Real Case)).
1. Alice and Bob agree on a discriminant ∆ > 0, ∆ ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4) and an equivalence
class of Cl∆. (These choices can be made public.)
2. Alice chooses an integer a uniformly at random from {1, . . . , ⌊√∆ ⌋}. She computes
a, the ideal to the left of a; that is, a = λ(a). She also computes ε(a) and sends a
and ε(a) to Bob.
3. Bob chooses an integer b uniformly at random from {1, . . . , ⌊√∆ ⌋}. He computes
b, the ideal to the left of b; that is, b = λ(b). He also computes ε(b) and sends b
and ε(b) to Alice.
4. Alice computes cA, the ideal to the left of a + ε(b) (relative to b); that is,
cA = λ(a+ ε(b) , b).
5. Bob computes cB, the ideal to the left of b + ε(a) (relative to a); that is,
cB = λ(b+ ε(a) , a).
6. Alice and Bob send each other one classical bit which allows them to determine
whether cA = cB. If this is not true, Alice and Bob make small adjustments
(see [SBW94]) after which they are certain that they have computed the same
ideal.
At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob share a secret ideal which they can use to
derive a secret key.
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13.2 Security Of The Protocol
In this section we discuss the security of each of the two cases of the Buchmann-Williams
protocol. As we will see, both cases are susceptible to attacks with a quantum com-
puter. In order to break the real case of the protocol, however, we will need two recently
discovered quantum algorithms.
13.2.1 The Imaginary Case
Since the imaginary case of the Buchmann-Williams protocol is equivalent to the Diffie-
Hellman protocol, as mentioned in Chapter 12 the scheme would be broken if the Dis-
crete Logarithm Problem (DLP) could be solved efficiently in the group Cl∆. There are
no known efficient classical algorithms to solve DLP in this group, however: the best
known algorithms still require superpolynomial time, like that in [Jac99]. Furthermore,
in [BW88] it is mentioned that if an efficient algorithm to solve DLP in Cl∆ did exist, it
could likely be used to factor ∆.
The group could possibly admit attacks that did not depend on solving DLP but on
solving the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) directly, but again, there is some evidence
described in [BW88] that these attacks could also lead to algorithms to factor ∆. These
facts suggest that breaking the scheme with a classical computer is at least as hard as
the factoring problem, which we believe to be hard. We therefore believe the protocol to
be secure against a passive adversary with a classical computer.
However, as mentioned in Section 3.8, there is an efficient quantum algorithm to solve
DLP. In other words, this protocol is not secure against a quantum adversary.
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13.2.2 The Real Case
Consider the following variation of DLP as proposed in [BW90]:
Problem 13.16 (Principal Ideal Distance Problem (PIDP)). Given a principal
ideal a of a real quadratic order O∆, compute δ(a), its distance from O∆.
Suppose an adversary can solve PIDP. When Alice sends a and ε(a) to Bob, the
adversary can compute δ(a), and hence determine δ(a) + ε(a) = a. The adversary then
has knowledge of Alice’s private value a (to some finite precision). With this knowledge,
with good probability the adversary can construct the shared secret in the same way
Alice does, and the protocol is broken. That is, an algorithm to solve PIDP would allow
an adversary to break the real version of the Buchmann-Williams key establishment
protocol.
There is evidence that PIDP is hard to solve with a classical computer. It is shown
in [BW90] that an efficient solution to PIDP would result in an efficient algorithm to
compute the regulator R∆. Further, it is shown in [Sch82] that an efficient algorithm to
compute R∆ would result in an efficient algorithm to factor ∆. Thus, PIDP is at least
as hard as the factoring problem, which we believe to be hard with a classical computer.
We therefore believe the protocol to be secure against a passive adversary with a classical
computer.
However, as recently discovered by Hallgren [Hal02], we can efficiently solve PIDP
with a quantum computer. Therefore the real version of the Buchmann-Williams key
establishment protocol can be broken by a passive adversary with a quantum computer.
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The remainder of this chapter introduces the new quantum algorithms that efficiently
solve PIDP. Suppose we are given a quadratic order O∆. We will describe two algorithms:
one that computes R∆, and another that given R∆ solves PIDP. The description of these
algorithms in [Hal02] is quite terse, and the presentation below attempts to provide
more details and to correct some of the minor errors in [Hal02]. A similar but indepen-
dently constructed clarification of the algorithm to compute the regulator can be found
in [Joz03], along with much of the background material already presented in this chapter.
13.2.3 Computing The Regulator
As mentioned above, much of the material in this section can also be found in [Joz03].
However, except where noted, the presentation here was developed independently.
We work in the identity class of Cl∆. Consider the function g : R −→ P∆×R defined
by g(x) = (λ(x) , ε(x)) for all x ∈ R.
Proposition 13.17. The function g is one-to-one on the interval [0, R∆) and periodic
with period R∆.
Proof. If g(x) = g(y) for any x, y ∈ [0, R∆), then λ(x) = λ(y) and
ε(x) = ε(y)
x− δ(λ(x)) ≡ y − δ(λ(y)) (mod R∆)
x− δ(λ(x)) ≡ y − δ(λ(x)) (mod R∆)
x ≡ y (mod R∆).
Further, x, y ∈ [0, R∆) so it follows that x = y, and g is one-to-one on [0, R∆).
126 CHAPTER 13. BUCHMANN-WILLIAMS KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Since the distance around the cycle of reduced ideals is R∆, it follows that for any
x ∈ R,
g(x+R∆) = (λ(x+R∆) , ε(x+R∆))
= (λ(x) , ε(x))
= g(x)
so g is periodic with period R∆.
We now have a periodic function with a domain of R. We would like to use techniques
similar to those from Section 3.4 to find the period of the function, but in order to compute
with the function we first have to modify it slightly so that its domain is some discrete set.
Such a modification will also have the effect of making the function no longer “perfectly”
periodic, but we will still be able to recover a close approximation to the period.
More specifically, as in [Hal02] we can define what it means for a function with an
integer domain to be “periodic” with a real (not necessarily integer) period. We use the
definition presented in [Joz03]:
Definition 13.18. Let X be any set. A function f : Z −→ X is called weakly periodic
with period s ∈ R if for all integers k, 0 ≤ k < s, and for all non-negative integers j,
either
1. f(k) = f(k + ⌊js⌋), or
2. f(k) = f(k + ⌈js⌉).
For brevity we will write f(k) = f(k + [js]) to indicate that one of the above conditions
is satisfied. The satisfied condition may vary with k and j.
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(Here we use the notation ⌊x⌋ to denote the largest integer less than or equal to x,
and ⌈x⌉ to denote the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. We will also use the
notation ⌊x⌉ to denote the closest integer to x.)
We now define a weakly periodic function by slightly modifying the function g. Given
a positive integer N , we define gˆ : Z −→ P∆× Z by gˆ(j) =
(
λ
(
j
N
)
,
⌊
N ε
(
j
N
)⌋)
for all
integers j.
As we will see, this function does not precisely satisfy the definition of a weakly
periodic function, but by choosing N wisely we can ensure that it satisfies the definition
for a large fraction of the integers k, 0 ≤ k < s. This statement is made more specific in
the following theorem:
Theorem 13.19. If N ≥ n32∆
3
then the function gˆ is one-to-one on the interval [0, NR∆)
and gˆ(k) = gˆ(k+[jNR∆]) for at least a
(
1− 1
O(n)
)
fraction of the integers k ∈ [0, NR∆).
Note that in the analogous theorem in [Hal02], it is stated without proof that we
should require only N ≥ n√∆. However, precise analysis in [Joz03] proves the existence
of the lower bound on N given in Theorem 13.19; so we use that lower bound here.
Proof. First we show that gˆ is one-to-one on the interval [0, NR∆).
If gˆ(j) = gˆ(k) for any j, k ∈ [0, NR∆) then λ
(
j
N
)
= λ
(
k
N
)
and
⌊N ε( j
N
)⌋ = ⌊N ε( k
N
)⌋
N ε
(
j
N
)
= N ε
(
k
N
)
+ σ
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for some σ with |σ| < 1. Dividing both sides by N , we get
ε
(
j
N
)
= ε
(
k
N
)
+ σ
N
j
N
− δ
(
λ
(
j
N
)) ≡ k
N
− δ
(
λ
(
k
N
))
+ σ
N
(mod R∆)
j
N
− δ
(
λ
(
j
N
)) ≡ k
N
− δ
(
λ
(
j
N
))
+ σ
N
(mod R∆)
j
N
≡ k
N
+ σ
N
(mod R∆).
Since 0 ≤ j, k < NR∆, we must have 0 ≤ jN , kN < R∆. Therefore, jN = kN + σN .
Further, since j, k ∈ Z and |σ| < 1, we must in fact have σ = 0, so j = k and thus gˆ is
one-to-one on [0, NR∆).
Now we wish to show that gˆ(k) = gˆ(k+[jNR∆]) for a sufficiently large fraction of the
integers k ∈ [0, NR∆). Choose any reduced ideal a, and consider the interval between
the distance of a and the distance of the next ideal in the cycle; in other words, the
interval I = [δ(a) , δ(ρ(a))). By a proven bound on the distance between consecutive
ideals developed in [Joz03] we know that I has length at least 3
32∆
.
Since we are given N ≥ n32∆
3
, we know that 3
32∆
≥ n
N
, and hence there are at least n
integers k in [0, NR∆) for which
k
N
∈ I. Let S be the set of all such integers.
For any k ∈ S, λ
(
k
N
)
= a. Further, if k 6= minS and k 6= maxS, and σ is chosen
such that 0 ≤ σ < 1, then maxS < k ± σ < minS, so
λ
(
k±σ
N
)
= λ
(
k
N
)
= a. (13.1)
Fix some value of j, and define the quantity σ1 = jNR∆−⌊jNR∆⌋. We assume that
jNR∆ 6∈ Z, so 0 < σ1 < 1.
We consider two cases:
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1. If we round down the value of jNR∆,
λ
(
k+⌊jNR∆⌋
N
)
= λ
(
k+jNR∆−σ1
N
)
= λ
(
k−σ1
N
+ jR∆
)
= λ
(
k−σ1
N
)
= λ
(
k
N
)
by Equation (13.1).
2. Similarly, if we round up the value of jNR∆,
λ
(
k+⌈jNR∆⌉
N
)
= λ
(
k+jNR∆+(1−σ1)
N
)
= λ
(
k+(1−σ1)
N
)
= λ
(
k
N
)
by Equation (13.1).
Thus for any k ∈ S, k 6= minS, k 6= maxS,
λ
(
k+⌊jNR∆⌋
N
)
= λ
(
k
N
)
= λ
(
k+⌈jNR∆⌉
N
)
. (13.2)
Now define the quantity σ2 = N ε
(
k
N
)− ⌊N ε( k
N
)⌋
. Then 0 ≤ σ2 < 1.
Again, we consider two cases:
1. If σ1 ≤ σ2, then ⌊
N ε
(
k+⌊jNR∆⌋
N
)⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k−σ1
N
+ jR∆
)⌋
=
⌊
N
(
k−σ1
N
− δ
(
λ
(
k−σ1
N
)))⌋
=
⌊
N
(
k
N
− σ1
N
− δ
(
λ
(
k
N
)))⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k
N
)− σ1⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k
N
)⌋
since σ1 ≤ σ2.
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2. If σ1 > σ2, then similarly
⌊
N ε
(
k+⌈jNR∆⌉
N
)⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k+(1−σ1)
N
+ jR∆
)⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k
N
)
+ (1− σ1)
⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k
N
)⌋
since 1− σ1 < 1− σ2.
Thus for any k ∈ S with k 6= minS, k 6= maxS,
⌊
N ε
(
k+[jNR∆]
N
)⌋
=
⌊
N ε
(
k
N
)⌋
. (13.3)
Combining Equation (13.2) and Equation (13.3), we see that
gˆ(k + [jNR∆]) = gˆ(k). (13.4)
Since |S| ≥ n and k can take on all but two of the values in S, Equation (13.4) is
satisfied for at least a
(
1− 2
n
)
fraction of the integers k ∈ S. The same argument can be
made for the interval between any two reduced ideals. Thus Equation (13.4) is satisfied
for at least a
(
1− 2
n
)
fraction of the integers k ∈ [0, NR∆). (This bound can in fact be
improved to a
(
1− 1
n
)
fraction with a slightly different analysis like that of [Joz03], but
the bound presented here is still sufficient.)
Therefore as required, gˆ(k + [jNR∆]) = gˆ(k) for at least a
(
1− 1
O(n)
)
fraction of the
integers k ∈ [0, NR∆).
We can now describe the core of the quantum algorithm to compute the regulator.
The algorithm will calculate an approximation to s = NR∆, from which we can recover
R∆. Like in Algorithm 3.11, we assume that we have a unitary operator Ugˆ that maps
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|x〉 |y〉 7−→ |x〉 |y ⊕ gˆ(x)〉. We also assume that we are given an integer m > 3s3, al-
though if the approximate size of s is unknown, we can use a technique similar to that
of Section 3.4, where we repeatedly double m until the algorithm succeeds.
Algorithm 13.20 (Core Of Computing The Regulator).
1. Start in the state |0〉 |0〉 ∈ Hm⊗Hl, where l is chosen such that l bits are sufficient
to encode any point in the range of gˆ.
2. Apply QFTm to the first register.
3. Apply Ugˆ to the system.
4. Measure the second register.
5. Apply QFTm to the first register.
6. Measure the first register to obtain the integer y. If y > m
n
, begin the procedure
again.
7. Otherwise, return y.
Theorem 13.21. With probability in O
(
1
log s
)
, the output of Algorithm 13.20 satisfies
y =
⌊
km
s
⌉
for some integer k.
Proof Sketch. After Step 3 our system is in the state |φ〉 = 1√
m
∑m−1
x=0 |x〉 |gˆ(x)〉. When
we measure the second register in Step 4, we see a value z, and we leave the first register
in a superposition of all states in which z appears in the second register.
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We now determine this superposition. Let m = ⌊ps⌋+r where p, r ∈ Z and 0 < r ≤ s;
in other words, m ≈ ps. By Theorem 13.19 we know that for an inverse polynomial
fraction of the integers k with 0 ≤ k < s, gˆ(k) = gˆ(k + [js]). So with high probability, if
z = gˆ(k), then z = gˆ(k + [js]) for all j, 0 ≤ j < p. Thus we can say that after Step 4 we
leave the first register in a state that is “close to”
|ψ〉 = 1√
p
p−1∑
j=0
|k + [js]〉 .
This is not exactly the state of the first register, since the function gˆ is not exactly
weakly periodic. The consequences of using this approximate data are not explicitly
analysed in [Hal02] or [Joz03]. However, both claim that because of the large fraction
of integers k for which gˆ(k) = gˆ(k + [js]) (see Theorem 13.19) the approximation is
close enough for the algorithm to succeed. Similarly, the remainder of the analysis here
assumes that the first register is in the exact state |ψ〉.
After applying QFTm to |ψ〉 in Step 5, we obtain the state
1√
pm
p−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
x=0
e2πix
k+[js]
m |x〉
= e2πi
k
m
1√
pm
m−1∑
x=0
p−1∑
j=0
e2πix
[js]
m |x〉 .
It is interesting to note that the global phase coefficient e2πi
k
m does not affect the
probability distribution of the results of measuring this state, since
∣∣∣e2πi km ∣∣∣2 = 1. (In
other words, we can assume without loss of generality that k = 0. It is a general property
of the Fourier sampling method used by this algorithm that given a group G and a subset
X of G, the distributions induced by applying the method to the superpositions
∑
x∈X |x〉
and
∑
x∈X |g + x〉 are identical for every g ∈ G [Hal02].)
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The probability of obtaining a particular measurement result y in Step 6 is therefore
given by
Py =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√pm
p−1∑
j=0
e2πiy
[js]
m
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (13.5)
As in [Hal02] (but in more detail) we now analyse this distribution.
Fix a value y =
⌊
km
s
⌉
for some integer k, and let y = km
s
+ ε where −1
2
≤ ε < 1
2
. For
each j, 0 ≤ j < p, let [js] = js+ δj, where −1 ≤ δj < 1.
Then note that
y
[js]
m
=
(
k
s
+
ε
m
)
(js+ δj)
= kj +
εjs
m
+
kδj
s
+
εδj
m
. (13.6)
Recall that in Step 6 we accepted only values of y that satisfied y ≤ m
n
. Thus
km
s
+ ε ≤ m
n
k
s
+
ε
m
≤ 1
n∣∣∣∣kδjs + εδjm
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣δjn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣kδjs + εδjm
∣∣∣∣ < 1n. (13.7)
Further note that εjs
m
=
(
j
p
) (
εsp
m
)
and
∣∣∣εsp
m
∣∣∣ ≈
∣∣∣∣εspsp
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 . (13.8)
We now appeal to Claim 3.2 of [Hal02], which we re-state more precisely but do not
prove. (See [Joz03] for a proof of the claim’s correctness.) The claim is the following:
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Proposition 13.22. Let n and q be positive integers, let α be a constant, |α| ≤ 3
4
, and
let β : Z → R be a function such that |β(j)| ≤ 1
n
for all j, 0 ≤ j < q − 1. Then there
exists a constant c such that if n ∈ O(log q),∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
j=0
e2πi(
j
q
α+β(j))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ cq2.
If we let β(j) =
kδj
s
+
εδj
m
and α = εsp
m
, then by Equation (13.7) and Equation (13.8),
respectively, the hypotheses of Proposition 13.22 are satisfied.
Further, combining Equation (13.5) and Equation (13.6), we see that
Py =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√pm
p−1∑
j=0
exp
(
2pii
(
kj +
εjs
m
+
kδj
s
+
εδj
m
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
pm
∣∣∣∣∣
p−1∑
j=0
exp
(
2pii
(
εjs
m
+
kδj
s
+
εδj
m
))∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
pm
∣∣∣∣∣
p−1∑
j=0
e2πi((
j
p)α+β(j))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
We can therefore apply Proposition 13.22 to the above sum, and deduce that
Py ≥ 1
pm
cp2 ≈ c
s
.
Finally, we calculate the number of y that satisfy the conditions of the theorem. By
the condition in Step 6 we know that 0 ≤ y ≤ m
n
. Using the fact that log s > n, we can
obtain a lower bound on the number of such y by counting only those that satisfy
0 ≤ y ≤ m
log s
. (13.9)
If 0 ≤ ⌊km
s
⌉ ≤ m
log s
, then 0 ≤ k ≤ s
log s
(approximately); so there are s
log s
values of y that
satisfy the conditions of the theorem and Equation (13.9).
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The probability that the output of the algorithm satisfies the conditions of the theorem
is therefore at least
s
log s
· Py = s
log s
· c
s
=
c
log s
which is in O
(
1
log s
)
as required.
The basic statement of Theorem 13.21 is that the probability of measuring such an
integer y is considerably higher than selecting the integer y uniformly at random from
0, . . . , m− 1.
The remainder of the algorithm to compute the regulator is purely classical and similar
to Algorithm 3.11 to solve the bounded case of the Integer Hidden Subgroup Problem
(IHSP); we do not prove its correctness here (see [Hal02] or [Joz03]). The algorithm
works as follows: we run Algorithm 13.20 twice, obtaining integers y1 and y2 which by
Theorem 13.21 with high probability are equal to
⌊
k1
m
s
⌉
and
⌊
k2
m
s
⌉
for some integers k1
and k2. Also, with high probability, gcd(k1, k2) = 1. Applying the continued fraction
algorithm from Section 3.4 to y1
y2
, and using an algorithm from [Hal02] to test whether a
given integer is “close to” a multiple of s, we can recover the integer k1.
Once we have recovered k1, we can compute
a =
⌊
k1m
y1
⌉
=
⌊
k1m
k1
m
s
⌉
= ⌊s⌉ .
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The final step of the algorithm is to compute a
N
; note that
|a− s| < 1
|a−NR∆| < 1∣∣∣ a
N
− R∆
∣∣∣ < 1
N
In other words, this polynomial time quantum algorithm allows us to determine the
regulator to arbitrary precision depending on our choice of N .
13.2.4 Solving The Principal Ideal Distance Problem
After computing the regulator, we can use another new quantum algorithm from [Hal02]
to solve PIDP. Given an ideal a, let the (unknown) distance of a be a. The goal of the
algorithm is to find a. We will use an algorithm similar to the algorithm in Section 3.8
for solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
We begin by defining a new periodic function, as suggested in [Zal03], that is based
on the function g from the previous section, although this new function has a two-
dimensional domain. Consider the function h : Z× R −→ P∆ ×R defined by
h(j, x) = g(aj + x)
= (λ(aj + x) , ε(aj + x)) .
We briefly justify that this function is periodic with a two-dimensional period given
by p1 = (0, R∆) and p2 = (−1, a):
1. Note that h((j, x) + p1) = h(j, x + R∆) = g(aj + x + R∆) = g(aj + x) since g is
periodic with period R∆ by Proposition 13.17.
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2. Note that h((j, x) + p2) = h(j − 1, x+ a) = g(a(j − 1) + x+ a) = g(aj + x).
Thus h is indeed a periodic function with the given two dimensional period. Note that
the unknown value a appears in p2, so if we could find the period of this function, we
could solve PIDP.
As in the previous section, we cannot easily compute with h, since the domain is not a
discrete set. We therefore modify h slightly, and define a new function hˆ : Z×Z → P∆×Z
by
hˆ(j1, j2) =
(
λ
(
aj1 +
j2
N
)
,
⌊
N ε
(
aj1 +
j2
N
)⌋)
.
(Note that hˆ(j1, j2) = gˆ
(
aj1 +
j2
N
)
where the domain of gˆ has been extended to R in the
natural way.) This function hˆ is the function proposed in [Hal02] and it is the function
on which the solution to PIDP is based.
At first it seems as though we cannot evaluate hˆ since we do not know a. However,
using an algorithm described in detail in [SBW94], given a we can compute the ideal to
the left of δ(a) j1 and its error; that is, we can compute λ(aj1) and ε(aj1). Since the
value j2
N
is known, we can use the methods described in Section 13.1.2 (in fact the same
methods that Alice and Bob use to carry out the real Buchmann-Williams protocol) to
compute λ
(
aj1 +
j2
N
)
and ε
(
aj1 +
j2
N
)
. (Note that at the end of these computations we
still do not know the value of a.)
We will solve a problem similar to the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP), although
in this case we do not have a hidden subgroup, but instead a hidden “group-like set”.
Consider the set T =
{
(s, t) ∈ Z× Z : (as + t
N
)
mod R∆ <
1
N
}
. The function hˆ is con-
stant on T because the interval
[
0, 1
N
)
is short enough that it contains only the ideal O∆,
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and thus for any x in the interval λ(x) = O∆ and ⌊N ε(x)⌋ = 0. So for any (s, t) ∈ T ,
hˆ(s, t) = (O∆, 0).
Next consider a coset of T , say T + (u, v). We can write this coset as follows:
T + (u, v) =
{
(s, t) ∈ Z× Z : (a(s− u) + t−v
N
)
mod R∆ <
1
N
}
=
{
(s, t) ∈ Z× Z : (as+ t
N
− (us+ v
N
))
mod R∆ <
1
N
}
.
In other words, this coset of T is the set of points (s, t) such that as+ t
N
is in the interval
of length 1
N
starting from us+ v
N
. We will denote this interval by I(u,v).
Unlike in an instance of the typical HSP, the function h is not necessarily constant
on the cosets of T . For example, suppose there is an ideal b in the interval I(u,v). Then
for the points x ∈ I(u,v) after b, λ(x) = b, but for the rest of the points x, λ(x) = ρ−1(b)
(the previous ideal in the cyclical ordering). Similarly, if there is a point y ∈ I(u,v) such
that the distance from y to λ(y) is a multiple of 1N then the value of ⌊N ε(x)⌋ will change
depending on whether x occurs before or after y.
It is in fact true that hˆ could take on at most 3 values on any coset of T , in the case
where the corresponding interval contains both an ideal b and a value y such that the
distance from y to λ(y) is a multiple of 1N . Consequently, hˆ must be constant on at least
1
3
of the elements in the coset. Although the implications of hˆ being only “approximately
constant” on the cosets of T are not explicitly analysed in [Hal02], the fraction of the
elements on which hˆ is constant is sufficient to allow the algorithm to succeed.
It should also be noted that two cosets of T may overlap without being exactly equal,
since we could have au+ v
N
≈ au′ + v′
N
with v 6= v′ and u 6= u′. However, for fixed u and
0 ≤ v < NR∆ it is true that the cosets {T + (u, v)} are disjoint, and h is distinct and
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approximately constant on these disjoint cosets.
First we select the parameters for the algorithm using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 13.23 (Parameter Selection For PIDP).
1. Compute the regulator R∆ using the algorithm from Section 13.2.3.
2. Choose an integer m > 2R∆.
3. Choose an integer b > n32∆
3
and compute the continued fraction expansion of bR∆
to find p, q ∈ Z such that
∣∣∣bR∆ − pq ∣∣∣ ≤ 14qm .
4. Let N = qb.
5. Output (R∆, m,N).
Proposition 13.24. The output of Algorithm 13.23 satisfies |NR∆ − ⌊NR∆⌉| ≤ 14m .
Proof. We know that ∣∣∣∣bR∆ − pq
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 14qm∣∣∣∣Nq R∆ − pq
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 14qm
|NR∆ − p| ≤ 1
4m
.
Now since p is an integer and its distance from NR∆ is less than
1
2
, we must have
p = ⌊NR∆⌉. Thus
|NR∆ − ⌊NR∆⌉| ≤ 1
4m
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as required.
Once the parameters have been selected, we can run the following algorithm to solve
PIDP.
Algorithm 13.25 (Core Of Solving PIDP).
1. Start in the state |0〉 |0〉 |0〉 ∈ Hmp ⊗ Hp ⊗ Hl, where p = ⌊NR∆⌉ and l is chosen
such that l bits are sufficient to encode any point in the range of hˆ.
2. Apply QFTmp ⊗QFTp to the first two registers.
3. Apply Uhˆ to the system.
4. Measure the third register.
5. Apply QFTmp ⊗QFTp to the first two registers.
6. Measure the first two registers to obtain the integers (s, t). If t > p
n
, begin the
procedure again.
7. Otherwise, return (s, t).
Theorem 13.26. With probability in O
(
1
log (NR∆)
)
the output (s, t) of Algorithm 13.25
satisfies
s− γt
mN
≡ at mod R∆
for some γt with |γt| ≤ 12 .
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Proof Sketch. First we claim that for any integer s, there is exactly one integer t with
0 ≤ t < NR∆ such that (s, t) ∈ T . To see this, suppose that (s, t1), (s, t2) ∈ T , with
0 ≤ t1, t2 < NR∆. Let εi =
(
as+ ti
N
)
mod R∆ for i = 1, 2, and define the integers k1 and
k2 such that as+
ti
N
= εi + kiR∆. Then 0 ≤ ε1, ε2 < 1N , so
|ε1 − ε2| < 1N∣∣as+ t1
N
− k1R∆ − as− t2N + k2R∆
∣∣ < 1
N∣∣ t1−t2
N
+ (k2 − k1)R∆
∣∣ < 1
N∣∣ t1−t2
N
∣∣ mod R∆ < 1N
|t1 − t2| mod NR∆ < 1
Thus since 0 ≤ t1, t2 < NR∆ we must have t1 = t2.
We now define
Tˆ =
{
(s, t) ∈ Z× Z : 0 ≤ t < NR∆,
(
as + t
N
)
mod R∆ <
1
N
}
and it follows that for each s ∈ Z, there is a unique element (s, t) ∈ Tˆ .
For each s ∈ Z, we can use this unique element (s, t) to define σs such that(
as− t
N
)
mod R∆ =
σs
N
. By the definition of Tˆ , 0 ≤ σs < 1.
Then note that for each (s, t) ∈ Tˆ ,
as+
t
N
− σs
N
= kR∆ (13.10)
for some integer k.
Now note the following:
1. t < NR∆, so kR∆ < as+R∆, and
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2. σs < 1, so as− 1N < kR∆.
Combining these two inequalities we obtain
as
R∆
− 1
NR∆
< k <
as
R∆
+ 1.
Therefore, with high probability, k =
⌈
as
R∆
⌉
.
Rewriting Equation (13.10) we see that
as+
t
N
− σs
N
=
⌈
as
R∆
⌉
R∆
t =
⌈
as
R∆
⌉
NR∆ − asN + σs (13.11)
After Step 3 of Algorithm 13.25 our system is in the state
|φ〉 = 1
p
√
m
mp−1∑
x=0
p−1∑
y=0
|x〉 |y〉 |h(x, y)〉 .
When we measure the third register in Step 4, we see a value z, and we leave the first
two registers in a superposition of all states in which z appears in the third register.
This value of z effectively specifies an interval I of length 1
N
, since its first coordinate
is an ideal, and its second coordinate specifies a distance past that ideal (rounded down
to a multiple of 1
N
). The interval I will be approximately equal to the interval I(0,v) for
some value of v, 0 ≤ v < NR∆; this approximation is also sufficient for our purposes. In
other words, the measurement in Step 4 fixes a value v such that the first two registers
of our system are in the state
|ψ〉 = 1
p
√
m
∑∑
0≤x<mp
0≤y<p
(x,y)∈T+(0,v)
|x〉 |y〉 .
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Since we are about to apply the same Fourier sampling technique discussed in Sec-
tion 13.2.3, we can again make use of the fact that the distributions induced by applying
the technique to superpositions of the elements of a set X and of some coset of X are
identical. In this case, we can therefore assume without loss of generality that v = 0, or
in other words, that the superposition in |ψ〉 is over the elements of T . Further, since
0 ≤ y < p, we can more precisely assume that the superposition is over the elements of
Tˆ . Thus without loss of generality, we can assume that
|ψ〉 = 1
p
√
m
∑∑
0≤x<mp
(x,y)∈Tˆ
|x〉 |y〉
=
1√
mp
mp−1∑
x=0
|x〉
∣∣∣∣
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
NR∆ − axN + σx
〉
by Equation (13.11).
Again we mention that this is not exactly the state of the first two registers because
of the numerous approximations we have made along the way. However, these approx-
imations have all been small enough so as to allow the remainder of the algorithm to
succeed.
Temporarily let y =
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
NR∆ − axN + σx. Then after applying QFTmp ⊗QFTp
in Step 5, we obtain the state
1
mp
√
p
mp−1∑
x=0
mp−1∑
u=0
p−1∑
v=0
exp
(
2piiu
x
mp
)
exp
(
2piiv
y
p
)
|u〉 |v〉
=
1
mp
√
p
mp−1∑
x=0
mp−1∑
u=0
p−1∑
v=0
exp
(
2pii
xu+ yvm
mp
)
|u〉 |v〉 .
The probability of obtaining a particular measurement result (s, t) is therefore given
by
P(s,t) =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1mp√p
mp−1∑
x=0
exp
(
2pii
xs + ytm
mp
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (13.12)
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As in [Hal02] (but in more detail) we now analyse this distribution.
The condition on (s, t) given in the statement of the theorem is equivalent to
s
mN
− γt
mN
− at = kR∆ (13.13)
for some integer k. Note the following:
1. γt ≤ 12 , so − 12mN − at ≤ kR∆, and
2. γt ≥ −12 and s ≤ mNR∆, so R∆ + 12mN − at ≥ kR∆.
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain
− at
R∆
− 1
2mNR∆
≤ k ≤ − at
R∆
+ 1 +
1
2mNR∆
.
Therefore, with high probability, k =
⌈
− at
R∆
⌉
= −
⌊
at
R∆
⌋
.
Rewriting Equation (13.13), we see that
s
mN
− γt
mN
− at = −
⌊
at
R∆
⌋
R∆
s = atmN −
⌊
at
R∆
⌋
mNR∆ + γt (13.14)
Now note that
xs+ ytm = xatmN − x
⌊
at
R∆
⌋
mNR∆ + xγt +
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
NR∆tm− axNtm+ σxtm
= mNR∆
(
t
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
− x
⌊
at
R∆
⌋)
+ xγt + tmσx.
Now define λ such that p = NR∆ + λ. Since p = ⌊NR∆⌉, by Proposition 13.24
|λ| ≤ 1
4m
. Then mNR∆ = mp − mλ, and taking the above equation modulo mp, we
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obtain
xs+ ytm ≡ −λm
(
t
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
− x
⌊
at
R∆
⌋)
+ xγt + tmσx (mod mp).
Finally, define δt and δx such that
⌊
at
R∆
⌋
= at
R∆
− δt and
⌈
ax
R∆
⌉
= ax
R∆
+ δx. Then
0 ≤ δt, δx < 1. Thus the above equation becomes
xs+ ytm ≡ −λm
(
t
ax
R∆
+ tδx − x at
R∆
+ xδt
)
+ xγt + tmσx (mod mp)
≡ −λmtδx − λmxδt + xγt + tmσx (mod mp)
≡ x (γt − λmδt) + tm (σx − λδx) (mod mp) (13.15)
Note that
|γt − λmδt| ≤ |γt|+ |−λmδt|
<
1
2
+
1
4m
·m · 1
=
3
4
. (13.16)
Also
∣∣∣∣tm (σx − λδx)mp
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣tm (1− 0)mp
∣∣∣∣
=
t
p
≤ 1
n
(13.17)
since in Step 6 we accepted only values of t with t ≤ p
n
.
If we let α = |γt − λmδt| and β(x) = tm(σx−λδx)mp then by Equation (13.16) and Equa-
tion (13.17), respectively, the hypotheses of Proposition 13.22 are again satisfied.
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Further, combining Equation (13.12) and Equation (13.15), we see that
P(s,t) =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1mp√p
mp−1∑
x=0
exp
(
2pii
x (γt − λmδt) + tm (σx − λδx)
mp
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
m2p3
∣∣∣∣∣
mp−1∑
x=0
e2πi((
x
mp)α+β(x))
∣∣∣∣∣
2
We can therefore apply Proposition 13.22 to the above sum, and deduce that
P(s,t) ≥ 1
m2p3
c(mp)2 ≈ c
NR∆
.
Finally, we calculate the number of (s, t) that satisfy the conditions of the theorem.
By the condition in Step 6 we know that 0 ≤ t ≤ p
n
. Using the fact that log (NR∆) > n,
we can obtain a lower bound on the number of such (s, t) by counting only those that
satisfy
0 ≤ t ≤ p
log (NR∆)
. (13.18)
Since p = ⌊NR∆⌉, then 0 ≤ t ≤ NR∆log (NR∆) (approximately), and for each value of t, there
must be at least one value of s such that (s, t) ∈ Tˆ . Thus there are at least NR∆
log (NR∆)
values (s, t) that satisfy the conditions of the theorem and Equation (13.18).
The probability that the output of the algorithm satisfies the conditions of the theorem
is therefore at least
NR∆
log (NR∆)
· P(s,t) = NR∆
log (NR∆)
· c
NR∆
=
c
log (NR∆)
which is in O
(
1
log (NR∆)
)
as required.
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The remainder of the algorithm to solve PIDP is purely classical, and we do not prove
its correctness here (see [Hal02]). The algorithm works as follows: we run Algorithm 13.25
until we obtain ordered pairs (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) with gcd(t1, t2) = 1. By Theorem 13.26
with high probability the ordered pairs satisfy
si−γti
mN
≡ ati mod R∆ for i = 1, 2. We then
use the extended Euclidean algorithm to find integers x, y such that xt1 + yt2 = 1, and
compute a˜ = xs1+ys2
mN
mod R∆. As proven in [Hal02], |a− a˜| ≤ 1.
It is acknowledged in [Hal02] that we would like to compute a to a higher accuracy,
but no specific method to do so is described. One such method would be to consider
the interval [a˜− 1, a˜+ 1], select N equally-spaced points in the interval, and perform
a binary search among those N points, finally selecting the smallest point ˜˜a for which
λ
(
˜˜a
)
= a. Then we know that ∣∣˜˜a− a∣∣ < 1
N
Therefore there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm to solve PIDP (that is,
to determine the distance of a principal ideal to arbitrary precision, depending on our
choice of N).
Chapter 14
Conclusions And Future Work
While large-scale quantum computers are not currently technologically feasible, this the-
sis has demonstrated that if they ever become realistic, they will pose a serious threat
to much of our secret communication. Today’s most widely-used public key cryptosys-
tems, such as the RSA cryptosystem studied in Chapter 4 and the ElGamal cryptosystem
studied in Chapter 6, as well as the popular key establishment protocols like the Diffie-
Hellman protocol from Chapter 12, are open to polynomial-time attacks with a quantum
computer.
Other less popular cryptosystems have been proposed that rely on the hardness of
other problems, and these schemes may be candidates for systems that resist quantum
cryptanalysis. For example, the McEliece cryptosystem described in Chapter 7 does
not seem to fit into a framework in which it could be attacked with today’s known set
of quantum algorithms. However, such less popular schemes may suffer from a lack of
efficiency compared to the more commonly used algorithms, and they may not have
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received the same degree of academic scrutiny as their more established counterparts.
However, not all of these alternative classical schemes are quantum-resistant: for example,
the real version of the Buchmann-Williams key establishment protocol from Chapter 13
does not seem to suffer from classical vulnerabilities, but recent developments in quantum
algorithm theory have exposed some quantum weaknesses.
This thesis has also touched on cryptosystems of historical importance, even though
such cryptosystems may no longer be feasible choices given the existence of known clas-
sical attacks. The lattice-based schemes presented in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are based
on hard problems that are fundamentally different from the standard cryptosystems in
use today, although unlike the McEliece cryptosystem, they have been shown to have
serious classical weaknesses. Nonetheless, they could provide a starting point for further
investigation of lattice-based cryptography. The NTRU scheme studied in Chapter 10 is
an example of another scheme that could resist a quantum attack if its recently discovered
classical vulnerabilities can be overcome.
Another new class of cryptosystems is made up of schemes that use a quantum com-
puter to aid the parties who wish to communicate securely; the quantum scheme described
in Chapter 11 is one concrete example of a scheme from this class. Since these cryptosys-
tems are necessarily quite new, and since they are currently only of theoretical interest,
they have not received much attention in the academic community. However, as attackers
begin to include quantum computers in their arsenals, the legitimate parties to secure
communication may be able to stay one step ahead by also using quantum computers.
Further, while this thesis has touched on many of today’s important cryptosystems,
there are still many more that could bear further investigation in a quantum setting.
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Examples of such cryptosystems would be newly-proposed schemes where operations are
carried out in a braid group [AAG99, AAFG01]. This thesis could also be extended by
performing quantum security analyses of public key signature schemes, which attempt
to provide authentic (as opposed to confidential) communication. Many of the cryp-
tosystems discussed in this thesis, such as the RSA, ElGamal, and NTRU schemes, have
associated signature schemes that are based on the hardness of similar problems. An-
other extension would be to analyse some of the popular symmetric key cryptosystems
in use today to see whether they might be susceptible to quantum attacks.
This thesis has gathered together many results from several areas of mathematics and
has presented them in a practical way. It has attempted to provide a clear presentation
of the basics of public key cryptography (for the cryptographic beginner) and a concise
introduction to many of the basics of quantum computation (for the quantum beginner).
Each cryptosystem has been presented along with enough background material to make
its basic concepts easy to understand. In some cases, such as that of the quantum
scheme in Chapter 11, the presentation has involved making some minor corrections and
clarifications to ambiguities in the original papers. In other cases, such as that of the
new quantum algorithms presented in Section 13.2.3 and Section 13.2.4, the presentation
has also been expanded considerably to provide a more detailed and precise analysis
geared to be more accessible to those without expertise in the field. Wherever possible,
parallels have been drawn between similar cryptosystems, or between cryptosystems built
on similar ideas. For many of the cryptosystems mentioned in this thesis, this may be
the first time that the schemes have been considered in a quantum setting.
The main goal of this thesis, however, has been to make it clear that the encryption
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schemes in current use will not provide a high level of security in a quantum setting.
While it would be unwise to claim that cryptosystems that currently resist quantum
attacks will necessarily continue to resist them, it would also be unwise to ignore the
possibility that large-scale quantum attacks will one day be feasible. We need to start
investigating alternative quantum-resistant cryptosystems now, in the event that we one
day need to make use of them.
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